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Polynesia in Review: Issues and Events, 
1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007
Reviews of American Sämoa, Hawai‘i, 
Niue, Tokelau, Tonga, and Tuvalu are 
not included in this issue.
Cook Islands
The period under review was domi-
nated by an unprecedented call for 
general elections, parliamentary con-
fl icts, and budget approval constraints 
that at times tested the interpretation 
of the powers of the head of state. 
Ongoing out-migration of Cook 
Islanders, environmental problems, 
and continuing infl ation slipped under 
the radar as politicians pushed for 
major salary increases and most Cook 
Islanders struggled from paycheck 
to paycheck. The popular American 
television series Survivor, and some 
sporting successes, provided some 
respite, but an unpredictable tourist 
industry, technical personnel limita-
tions, and occasional invasive diseases 
and insects reminded Cook Islanders 
to be constantly vigilant.
July 2006 began with continuing 
concern by many observers about the 
leak of the Queen’s Honours list from 
the offi ce of Prime Minister Jim Maru-
rai, which he dismissed as “unimport-
ant” (CIN, 5 July, 4). Perhaps of more 
concern to Marurai were political 
undercurrents aimed toward replac-
ing him and the Speaker of the House 
(CIN, 6 July 2006, 1). Meanwhile, 
one of the laws fi nalized by the Cook 
Islands Parliament was a Marriage 
Amendment Bill outlawing marriages 
between homosexuals. The law was 
clearly designed to counter the provi-
sions of New Zealand’s civil union 
legislation (CIN, 19 July 2006, 1).
Government also committed itself 
to a variety of programs including the 
development of geotourism through 
an agreement signed by Tourism 
Minister Wilkie Rasmussen and Sarah 
Laskin, vice president of public and 
business development for National 
Geographic. The agreement obligated 
the island country to adhere to four-
teen geotourism principles designed 
to sustain and enhance the geographic 
character of a given place, including 
the environment, culture, aesthetics, 
and the well-being of its people. In 
return, National Geographic prom-
ised to produce maps and brochures 
“which identify the unique features of 
the Cook Islands” (CIN, 2 Aug, 2006, 
1). The Cook Islands becomes only 
the fourth country to accede to the 
charter.
In July Teina Bishop, member for 
Arutanga (Aitutaki), resigned from his 
cabinet post realigning himself with 
the opposition Cook Islands Party 
(cip). Not long after, Kiriau Turepu 
(cip) won the snap election for the 
Matavera (Rarotonga) constituency, 
potentially changing the balance of 
power in Parliament and creating a 
footing for a change of government 
(CIN, 20 July 2006, 1). The political 
battle intensifi ed when opposition cip 
members met in Parliament without 
Democratic Party (Demo) govern-
ment members. After swearing in the 
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newly elected Kiriau Turepu, they 
voted the Demo government out. The 
event was broadcast live on national 
radio, attracting accusations of a coup 
attempt bordering on sedition and 
treason. The extraordinary chain of 
events became even more confusing 
when Queen’s Representative Sir Fred-
erick Goodwin called for a general 
election. This essentially negated the 
by-election just won by Turepu and 
preempted the later attempt by cip 
parliamentarians to use a vote of no 
confi dence to force a change of gov-
ernment (CIN, 25 July 2006). The high 
court was drawn into the drama amid 
accusations of political maneuvering 
on both sides of the aisle. Meanwhile, 
caretaker Prime Minister Jim Marurai 
tried to reassure the general popula-
tion that there was no cause for alarm 
(CIN, 25 July 2006, 1). The election 
was set for 26 September 2006.
Sir Geoffrey Arama Henry 
announced his retirement from the 
Cook Islands Party leadership effec-
tive 31 August 2006, and as mem-
ber of Parliament representing the 
Takuvaine (Rarotonga) constituency. 
Mark Brown replaced Henry as cip 
candidate for Takuvaine, and Tom 
Marsters, the member of Parlia-
ment for Murienua (Rarotonga), was 
eventually elected to lead the Cook 
Islands Party in Parliament (CIN, 13 
Dec 2006, 1). The party now faces 
multiple challenges: new leadership, a 
seemingly overzealous head of state, 
possible court challenges, and a pend-
ing general election.
As candidates fi led their nomina-
tions for the elections, Wilkie Ras-
mussen switched his allegiance to the 
Democratic Party. He had originally 
won his seat by nine votes over Demo 
candidate Tepure Tapaitau CIN, 10 
Aug 2006, 1). Apparently catching the 
campaign committee off guard, the 
Cook Islands Party failed to nominate 
a substitute candidate, so Rasmus-
sen entered the election unopposed. 
The election was hotly contested 
for 23 of the 24 seats. After some 
recounts—and allegations of bribery 
involving bread, fi sh, pearls, and an 
excavator—the Democratic Party 
won a majority of seats and formed a 
government (CIN, 14 Oct 2006, 1; CIN, 
27 Oct 2006, 1).
During this intense election period, 
the caretaker government faced 
budgetary limitations, and the queen’s 
representative issued an unprecedented 
decree authorizing bridging expen-
diture from 20 November to twelve 
sitting days after the fi rst meeting of 
the newly elected Parliament (CIN, 
18 Nov 2006, 1). In the subsequent 
debate over the intervention, New 
Zealand constitutional expert Dr 
Alex Frame warned that the claim 
of “necessity” cited by the head of 
state was diffi cult to justify (CIN, 18 
Dec 2006, 1). A second legal opinion 
by Dr William Hodges, a member of 
the Auckland University law faculty, 
supported Frame’s remarks but added 
that the queen’s representative “does 
have reserve powers ‘to sustain and 
not to destroy’ peace, order and good 
government as provided by the consti-
tution” (CIN, 21 Dec 2006, 13).
The national police provided one 
focus for the newly constituted Demo 
government when an eagerly awaited 
review identifi ed poor leadership, 
fi nancial mismanagement, and lack of 
public confi dence as key issues fac-
ing the force (CIN, 5 Dec 2006, 1). In 
April, the cabinet appointed Patrick 
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Tasker, a New Zealand inspector, as 
the new commissioner of police. The 
new commissioner will be expected 
to manage necessary changes while 
sustaining police operations (CIN, 28 
April 2007, 1). In another change, 
local Shola Ivaiti was named to replace 
Kevin Carr as fi nancial secretary (CIN, 
23 Feb 2007, 1). Earlier, former Solici-
tor General Janet Maki became the 
country’s fi rst woman ombudsman, 
beginning her new job 15 November 
2006 (CIN, 1 Nov 2006, 1). Her stated 
goal was to provide a public service 
that ensures government accountabil-
ity (CIN, 3 Nov 2006, 3).
The issue of fi sheries poaching 
emerged in December, when long-liner 
FV Tim Tam was captured by a police 
squad fi shing ninety nautical miles 
south-southwest of Penrhyn Island. 
The Tim Tam had a Korean captain 
and a crew made up of a Samoan, 
Fijian, Chinese, and three Taiwanese 
sailors (CIN, 6 Dec 2006, 1). About 
seventeen tons of mostly albacore tuna 
on board were sold off cheaply to the 
general public in Rarotonga (CIN, 14 
Dec 2006, 1). Skipper Yeong Bae Han 
was convicted and fi ned the minimum 
nz$100,000, a far cry from the legal 
maximum of nz$1 million (CIN, 16 
Dec 2006, 1). In May 2007, a Taiwan-
ese long-lining vessel FV Yin Chen 
No 1 was caught fi shing illegally and 
Captain Man Liu Tsai was convicted 
in the high court. Noting that the ves-
sel had made multiple excursions into 
the Cook Islands exclusive economic 
zone, the court ordered a fi ne of 
nz$200,000 plus nz$50,000 in costs 
(CIN, 24 May 2007, 1).
Another focus for controversy was 
the Ports Authority Board, whose 
chairman Don Beer Jr was sacked by 
Cook Islands Investments Corporation 
(ciic) board chairman Julian Dash-
wood over plans to tour Auckland 
ports in February 2007. The decision 
to terminate Beer may have also been 
infl uenced by a December 2006 audit 
that claimed improper payments of 
over nz$30,000 for consultancy work 
(CIN, Feb 2007, 1). Dashwood himself 
was later terminated after the change 
of government. “Maybe it’s because 
I was trying to weed out corruption. 
I guess my standards are higher than 
theirs,” declared Dashwood (CIN, 22 
Feb 2007, 1). The Chamber of Com-
merce weighed in on the controversy 
by expressing concern at the “appar-
ent political interference shown by 
the sacking of Dashwood (CIN, 23 
Feb 2007, 1). Local businessman Sam 
“Gumby” Crocombe replaced Beer as 
the new chairman of the Ports Author-
ity Board, while Tapi Taio replaced 
Dashwood as ciic chairman (CIN, 9 
March 2007, 1).
In April 2007, the Chinese-funded 
National Police Headquarters in 
Avarua was fi nally opened with a 
ceremony led by Queen’s Representa-
tive Sir Frederick Goodwin and the 
Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yuan-
yuan (CIN, 2 April 2007, 5). The 
government revealed a Chinese-funded 
nz$7.5 million road-upgrading project 
for the 5.5-kilometer stretch of back 
road from Nikao to Takuvaine, to be 
completed in time for the 2009 South 
Pacifi c Mini Games (CIN, 14 March 
2007, 1). China also agreed to fund 
a new sports stadium for the Cook 
Islands with nz$4 million in aid, plus 
a further nz$2 million in concessional 
loans (CIN, 20 March 2007, 1).
In January, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Immigration Wilkie Ras-
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mussen noted an increase in foreigners 
illegally working in the country. He 
warned that it was a serious issue and, 
after meeting with communities of 
Samoans, Fijians, Kiribati, and others, 
some twenty foreigners were given 
forty days to leave the country (CIN, 5 
Jan 2007, 1; CIN, 25 May 2007, 1).
As of December 2006, the Cook 
Islands total population including 
visitors was 19,569 (9,932 men and 
9,637 women), an increase of 8.6 
percent compared to the last census 
in 2001. Large population declines 
were noted for the Northern group, 
especially Manihiki Island, from 515 
in 2001, to 351 in 2006 (CIN, 13 April 
2007, 1). 
The budget estimate for the 2006–
2007 fi nancial year tabled in Parlia-
ment by Minister of Finance Dr Tere-
pai Maoate totaled nz$106.9 million 
(CIN, 14 Dec 2006, 1). The 2007–2008 
budget policy estimates the govern-
ment’s net worth at nz$133.6 million 
in the new fi nancial year, noting that 
aid to the Cook Islands is expected to 
total nz$28.7 million. This represents 
a drop of nz$8.6 million, partially 
explained by the removal of a one-off 
Australian payment of nz$4.5 million 
for the upgrade of the patrol boat Te 
Kukupa in the 2006 budget (CIN, 3 
April 2007, 1). New Zealand retained 
its designation as the highest donor to 
the Cook Islands with nz$10.3 million 
in aid. Government debt is expected to 
be nz$54.8 million by June 2007. The 
budget statement anticipated that pro-
ceeds from the pearl industry would 
increase by 10 percent (from nz$2.1 
million in 2006), while the fi shing 
industry would continue exporting an 
estimated nz$9.9 million worth of fi sh 
a year (CIN, 3 April 2007, 1).
In March 2007, Parliament changed 
a law empowering the cabinet to give 
members a pay raise without being 
bound by the independent Remunera-
tion Tribunal (CIN, 8 March 2007, 
1). Proposed adjustments would 
increase the prime minister’s salary 
from nz$75,000 to nz$105,000, with 
members of Parliament going from 
nz$35,000 to nz$50,000 per year 
(CIN, 12 April 2007, 1). The increases 
are apparently exclusive of many addi-
tional allowances. A group for politi-
cal change challenged the government 
to justify the change, and the Chamber 
of Commerce’s Teresa Manarangi-
Trott described the raises as extremely 
disturbing (CIN, 10 March 2007, 1; 
CIN, 20 March 2007, 1).
Tourism remained the largest indus-
try in the Cook Islands. Spotlight-
ing that market, Air New Zealand’s 
short-haul group general manager 
Norm Thompson and Air Rarotonga’s 
managing director Ewan Smith signed 
a new code-share agreement to pro-
vide joint schedules between Aitutaki 
and Rarotonga beginning in May 
2007 (CIN, 5 April 2007, 1). Air Tahiti 
began its fi rst Tahiti-Rarotonga con-
necting fl ight under a code-shared ser-
vice with Air Rarotonga (CIN, 3 April 
2007, 1). The joint venture offers a 
twice-a-week service (CIN, 4 April 
2007, 1). Cruise ship tourism contin-
ued during the year, and the 119,000 
ton, 750-cabin Sapphire Princess, 
 carrying 2,670 passengers, became 
the largest cruise ship yet to visit 
Rarotonga (CIN, 30 April 2007, 1).
During this review period, the 
government launched the country’s 
fi fteen-year sustainable develop-
ment plan titled “Living the Cook 
Islands Vision—A 2020 Challenge” 
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(Te  Kaveinga Nui—Pathway for 
Sustain able Development in the Cook 
Islands). In a public meeting, hotel 
entrepreneur and economist Tata 
Crocombe called it a plan to nowhere, 
pointing out that it failed to incor-
porate some of the country’s big-
gest problems such as depopulation, 
human resource development, aid 
dependence—and politicians. More-
over he observed that the government 
was too big (CIN, 25 Jan 2007, 1). 
Cabinet Minister Wilkie Rasmussen 
defended the government by point-
ing out that the issues mentioned by 
 Crocombe were not new, labeling 
his comments as “purely  ideals and 
theories of convenience” (CIN, 26 Jan 
2007, 4).
During the year, Tata Crocombe’s 
sweetheart deal in purchasing the 
government-owned Rarotongan Hotel 
reemerged in the news. Tata Cro-
combe had been recruited by Sir Geof-
frey Henry’s government to broker the 
sale of state assets, but ended up pur-
chasing the hotel himself for nz$3.25 
million with no money down, and a 
grace period of ten years to pay back 
the money with no interest charges. 
The media noted that the ten-year 
period was ending in September 2007 
(CIN, 18 Jan 2007, 1). Crocombe was 
also linked to a proposed Black Rock 
tourist development scheme incorpo-
rating the current golf course, Black 
Rock preschool, and Harley Street in 
Rarotonga (CIN, 25 Nov 2006, 1).
Throughout the year under review, 
religion maintained a powerful 
infl uence on politics. The Religious 
Advisor Council (rac), representing 
the Cook Islands Christian Church, 
Catholic, Seventh-Day Adventist, Lat-
ter-day Saints, Assembly of God and 
Apostolic Church denominations, was 
regularly called on to offer invoca-
tions and benedictions at government 
functions and events. In July 2006, the 
council issued a call for a national day 
to pray and fast for the political “cir-
cus” occurring in the Cook Islands. 
The rac chairman, Pastor Tutai Pere, 
declared that the tiny nation needed 
“deliverance from further political 
bondage of disunity, instability and 
uncertainty” (CIN, 6 July 2006, 1). 
In another public display of political 
pressure, Ngatangiia Cook Islands 
Christian Church Pastor Iana Aitau 
asked police to enforce a ban prevent-
ing people from swimming or surfi ng 
on Sundays. The police responded 
that they could only ask people but 
in effect could not enforce such a rule 
(CIN, 11 July 2006, 1).
In 2007 Cook Islanders appeared 
in third place on a list of the world’s 
fattest countries. Nauru topped the list 
with the greatest percentage of over-
weight adults (94.5 percent) followed 
by Federated States of Micronesia, 
Cook Islands, Niue, Tonga, Sämoa, 
Palau, and Kiribati. The United States 
follows in ninth place (74.1 percent). 
Conducted by the United Nations 
World Health Western Pacifi c Regional 
offi ce and the London-based Interna-
tional Obesity Task Force, researchers 
looked at the adult population over 
age fi fteen. Obesity rates highlighted 
imbalances between levels of physical 
activity, and signifi cant changes in diet 
(CIN, 21 Feb 2007, 1).
The review period also saw a sharp 
rise in dengue fever cases (CIN, 14 Feb 
2007, 1). The Cook Islands Ministry 
of Health fi nally responded with plans 
for a mosquito-spraying blitz (CIN, 
15 Feb 2007, 1). Although the use of 
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Reslin in the spray and its potentially 
toxic effects received some heavy criti-
cism from the public, spraying con-
tinued anyway (CIN, 18 April 2007, 
1). A total of 1,394 cases of dengue 
have been recorded since May 2006, 
with most (1,296) having occurred 
in Rarotonga. Some nineteen tourists 
were affected.
Educational initiatives were also in 
the news during the year. Thirty-fi ve 
students enrolled in the University 
of the South Pacifi c’s new Master of 
Business Administration program, 
most being heads of departments 
paying their own way (CIN, 16 Feb 
2007, 1). The usp center also received 
a nz$300,000 upgrade (CIN, 25 June 
2007, 1). On the downside, the Cook 
Islands government withdrew its 
support for the South Pacifi c School 
of Medicine set up in Rarotonga on 
16 March 2004. It was to be a two-
year course costing foreign students 
us$39,000 (nz$56,000). The govern-
ment removed its backing after discov-
ering that the founder, controversial 
American Dr Larry Sands, had been 
convicted of mail fraud, and disci-
plined for prescribing wrong medi-
cines (CIN, 21 March 2007, 1).
By July of 2006, the popular televi-
sion series American Survivor had 
begun fi lming its “reality game” on 
Aitutaki. Filming in Cook Islands was 
completed by 4 August, and Tour-
ism Authority chief executive Chris 
Wong revealed that the production 
had injected an estimated nz$3 mil-
lion into the Cook Islands economy 
(CIN, 5 August 2006, 1). Exposure 
of the Cook Islands to over 16 mil-
lion people in the United States alone 
was expected to increase visitors to 
the country. Wong stated, “Our hope 
is that outside entertainment value 
that reality tv shows provide, viewers 
will fi nd the natural attractions of the 
country highly appealing and consider 
the Cook Islands as an option for an 
island vacation” (CIN, 20 Jan 2007, 7).
Another attraction in the Cook 
Islands during the year was the tradi-
tional canoe-building project, Te Mire 
Tarai Vaka (CIN, 18 July 2006, 1). 
However the most challenging sport-
ing event was the third Vaka Eiva, 
a canoe race around the island of 
Rarotonga involving thirty-fi ve teams 
of canoe paddlers from New Zealand, 
Australia, Hawai‘i, Fiji, Niue, Tahiti, 
and Cook Islands (CIN, 17 Nov 2006, 
1–17).
The year under review was also 
marked by drug and criminal activi-
ties. Cocaine bound for Rarotonga 
and valued at nz$5.6 million was 
seized in Auckland. Hidden in the 
linings of two suitcases, the cocaine is 
believed to have come from São Paulo, 
South America. It is uncertain whether 
Rarotonga was the fi nal destination or 
a transit point to the Australian mar-
ket (CIN, 29 Nov 2006, 1). An unpro-
voked stabbing of an unarmed youth 
brought the realities of big city vio-
lence to Rarotonga, with Cook Islands 
police declaring their determination 
to stamp it out (CIN, 21 Dec 2006, 
1). The Religious Advisory Council 
reacted to the stabbing by calling for 
the formation of a youth action team 
dubbed “Youth for Life—Mapu Kia 
Ora” (CIN, 22 Dec 2006, 1).
Cook Islanders continued to take a 
deep interest in environmental issues. 
As active participants in the United 
Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and the Kyoto 
Protocol since 1992, the Cook Islands 
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joined other island countries in a plea 
for a reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions to larger countries that con-
tribute most to global warming. Island 
nations have been described as “the 
conscience” on climate change (CIN, 
21 Dec 2006, 5). The Cook Islands 
is already being impacted by climatic 
changes, particularly with regard to 
its tourism and pearl industries (CIN, 
16 April 2007, 3).
As part of the government’s plan 
to reduce dependency on fossil oil, 
a wind energy farm project was 
proposed at Kiikii on the island of 
Rarotonga (CIN, 24 Jan 2007, 1). 
Preliminary testing for persistent 
organic pollutants (pops) in Raro-
tonga lagoons indicated concentra-
tions of chlorinated pesticide (ddt 
and methoxychlor), polycyclice 
aromatic hydrocarbons (pah) and 
phthalates (dehp) above the detec-
tion limit. Environmentalist Imogen 
Ingram pointed out that the govern-
ment needed to take positive action 
to remedy the environmental chal-
lenge because it was a signatory to the 
Stockholm Convention that agreed to 
a total eradication of pops (CIN, 15 
Nov 2006, 7).
Another problem that emerged 
during the year took the form of the 
glassy-winged “sharpshooter” bug. 
Discovered in Rarotonga, and sus-
pected to have arrived on plants smug-
gled in from Tahiti, the insect feeds on 
more than three hundred host plants 
including trees, crops, and plants such 
as hibiscus, gardenia, and papaya. 
It is also known to transmit Pierce’s 
disease, which affects grapevines (CIN, 
4 April 2007, 1, 7). In more positive 
environmental news, the year marked 
the return of the kura or lorikeet 
bird, which was once plentiful on the 
island of Atiu. Before it became almost 
extinct, its feathers were used for the 
cloaks and headdresses of high chiefs. 
In a joint effort in April, naturalists 
and Atiuans brought in twenty-seven 
birds from Rimatara Island in French 
Polynesia (CIN, 28 April 2007, 1).
As part of its Unit Titles Bill initia-
tive the Tepaki group purchased the 
twelve-unit Castaway property for 
nz$2.3 million, adding to their recent 
purchases of Manea Beach for nz$1.8 
million, and Lagoon Lodges for nz$4 
million, with expected settlements for 
the Aquarius and the Manuia Beach 
properties (CIN, 2 May 2007, 1). The 
Tepaki group also maintains a keen 
interest in building a high-rise apart-
ment block on the Cook Islands High 
Commission offi ce location in New 
Zealand. The New Zealand High 
Court had ruled against Tepaki’s so-
called “diplomatic project,” which 
planned to turn the Cook Islands High 
Commission chancery in Wellington 
into a high-rise offi ce and apartment 
complex. Originally approved by the 
Cook Islands government, the deal 
was canceled when certain conditions 
were not met and when the govern-
ment changed (CIN, 18 Oct 2006, 1).
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French Polynesia
Political instability continued in 
French Polynesia during the year 
under review. The barely two-year-
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old pro-independence government 
of Oscar Temaru lost power to a 
pro-French coalition when assembly 
members switched their allegiances. 
However, the new government stood 
on very unstable foundations from 
the beginning, and its internal divi-
sions became more and more apparent 
toward the end of the review period.
July 2006 started with the highly 
publicized inauguration of a monu-
ment for the victims of nuclear testing 
by President Temaru on the fortieth 
anniversary of the fi rst French nuclear 
test on Moruroa Atoll (TPM, July 
2006; TP, 2 July 2006). While former 
territorial governments had supported 
the French policy of denying the issue 
of irradiation, Temaru’s administra-
tion took sides with the test victims 
association, Moruroa e Tatou (Moru-
roa and Us), and supported their 
claims for transparency, independent 
inquiries, and medical follow-up for 
the former test workers and inhabit-
ants of the islands closest to the testing 
base. French High Commissioner 
Anne Boquet, however, declared the 
inauguration to be an “unfriendly ges-
ture” toward France (TP, 3 July 2006).
In late July, Florent de Vathaire, a 
radiation expert from the National 
Institute for Health and Medical 
Research (inserm) of France, pre-
sented the results of a long-term study 
of thyroid cancer in French Polynesia. 
The study demonstrated a correlation 
between exposure to above-average 
radiation and the increase in cases of 
thyroid cancer, making him the fi rst 
agent of a French government offi ce 
to confi rm the harmfulness of the tests 
(TP, 2 Aug 2007). He called for the 
immediate declassifi cation of all medi-
cal fi les since the beginning of above-
ground testing and communicated the 
results of his study in an open letter to 
President Temaru, who read it in front 
of the Assembly of French Polynesia 
(TP, 4 Aug 2007). 
On 4 August the French State 
Council removed Representative 
Nicole Bouteau from the assembly and 
declared her ineligible for one year. 
This was after the electoral audit offi ce 
detected a procedural mistake during 
the election campaign in 2005, when 
Bouteau’s party No Oe E Te Nunaa 
did not properly designate its fi nancial 
delegate (TP, 4 Aug 2007). The harsh 
punishment of a young politician with 
no prior record of misdealings, for an 
accidental mistake, seemed at odds 
with the lenient treatment of other 
individuals previously charged with 
corruption. Although sentenced for 
embezzlement of public funds earlier 
in 2006, Emile Vernaudon remained 
eligible, and on 13 July a court abbre-
viated Henri Flohr’s fi ve-year period 
of ineligibility for political corruption 
(TP, 17 July 2007; TPM, Sept 2007). 
Bouteau, one of the country’s most 
popular and respected politicians, was 
replaced in the assembly by Thilda 
Fuller of the Fetia Api party, led by 
Philip Schyle. The Fetia Api party now 
had two representatives, and Bouteau’s 
party was no longer represented.
In mid-October, another political 
crisis occurred when trade union mem-
bers attempted to force the Temaru 
government to resign. After union 
leader Ronald Terorotua unsuccess-
fully called for a general strike, on 12 
October members of his trade union O 
Oe To Oe Rima (You Are Your Own 
Hand) blocked the main road into 
downtown Papeete. They were joined 
by members of the former territorial 
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militia Groupement d’Intervention de 
la Polynésie (gip, Polynesian Inter-
vention Grouping) under its ex-com-
mander Léonard Puputauki. The gip 
had been dissolved by the Temaru 
government in January but continued 
to erect roadblocks throughout the 
following months. Members of a bus 
drivers’ union reinforced the road-
blocks with their buses. The protesters 
did not give clear reasons for their 
actions, expressing only a general 
sentiment of dissatisfaction, and the 
Temaru government refused to negoti-
ate with them. Temaru then left the 
country to attend the Pacifi c Islands 
Forum in Fiji, where French Polynesia 
and New Caledonia were admitted as 
associate members (TP, 25 Oct 2007). 
After the president left, the protesters 
removed the roadblocks, but on 21 
October they occupied the presidential 
palace, the vice president’s offi ce, and 
the assembly building. Temaru inter-
preted this as an attempted coup and, 
from Suva, requested that the French 
security forces intervene. During the 
night of 22–23 October, French para-
military police squads, under orders 
from the high commission, intervened 
to liberate the occupied buildings. 
They used teargas to disperse the pro-
testers in front of the assembly build-
ing after some of them turned violent 
(TP, 23 Oct 2007).
After the president’s return, the 
strike leaders called a demonstration 
and demanded the resignation of High 
Commissioner Boquet, but only about 
two hundred people showed up for the 
march. The blockades were inter-
preted, not as expressions of public 
dissatisfaction, but rather as maneu-
vers manipulated by the political 
opposition (TPM, Nov 2006).
While the French intervention 
reinforced the position and credibility 
of the French state, it raised questions 
about the credibility of Temaru and 
his government, since he had vigor-
ously denounced the French security 
forces in the past. While ordering 
them to intervene on his behalf, he 
made strong declarations criticizing 
France at the Pacifi c Islands Forum 
meeting (TPM, Nov 2006). 
In a communiqué on 1 November, 
the presidency explained its strategy to 
pursue the reinscription of the country 
on the UN list of non-self-govern-
ing territories. This would guarantee 
an international process of decolo-
nization, and allow the population 
to choose between various options, 
including independence (TP, 1 Nov 
2006). Nevertheless, Temaru con-
tinued to be attacked by pro-French 
forces for his alleged support of 
independence. Throughout the second 
half of the year, controversial state-
ments by the president, his cabinet, 
and assembly members continued to 
provoke heated debate. At the opening 
of the agricultural show in September, 
Temaru deplored the increasing inabil-
ity of young Tahitians to farm and 
fi sh, and accused the French educa-
tion system of producing only “idiots 
and unemployed” (TP, 4 Sept 2007; 
TPM, Sept 2007). During an assembly 
session in December, Union pour la 
Démocratie (upld) representative 
Ruben Teremate raised his concerns 
about the immigration of French 
settlers, referring to “‘ofe popa‘a” 
(foreign bamboo) displacing the “‘ofe 
ma‘ohi” (native bamboo) on the west 
coast of Tahiti. During the same ses-
sion, Temaru welcomed the assembly 
members with the words “Greetings to 
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the ho‘o ‘äi‘a [sellouts] and to the here 
‘äi‘a [patriots]” (TP, 10 Dec 2006). 
The French high commissioner and 
the pro-French opposition denounced 
these speeches as provocative, racist, 
and xenophobic.
On 10 November, Health Minister 
Pia Hiro resigned, accusing Temaru 
of giving inappropriate guidelines for 
health policy. While Hiro wished to 
maintain the present French standards 
in the local health system, Temaru 
had suggested keeping costs down by 
applying the standards of the indepen-
dent Pacifi c Islands countries instead. 
Temaru appointed Tahitian physician 
Dr Charles Tetaria as the new minister 
for health (TPM, Dec 2006; TP, 12 Nov 
2006).
Amid all these political troubles, 
the government sponsored the cel-
ebrations for the new local holiday 
Matari‘i i Ni‘a on 20 November. The 
rising of the Pleiades (Matari‘i i ni‘a) 
marked the beginning of the most fer-
tile season in ancient Tahitian culture. 
The Temaru government had made 
this the new offi cial local holiday, 
replacing 29 June, which marked the 
annexation of the Tahitian kingdom to 
France in 1880. Under the Flosse gov-
ernment 29 June had been celebrated 
as the “day of autonomy.” While the 
latter was politically controversial, 20 
November was intended to be a purely 
cultural celebration of Polynesian 
identity and spirituality (TP, 30 Oct 
2007). The 2006 celebrations became 
a large pan-Polynesian cultural festi-
val, with groups from Aotearoa, 
Tonga, Sämoa, Tokelau, Hawai‘i, and 
Rapa Nui participating. The festival 
was opened with a kava ceremony as 
well as traditional proceedings led by 
the religious revival group Te Hivare-
reata under the leadership of Tahu‘a 
(traditional priest) Sunny Moanaura 
Walker. The celebrations once more 
epitomized the new cultural policy of 
traditional revival and reintegration 
into the wider Polynesian community 
(TP, 19 and 21 Nov 2007).
While the government thus contin-
ued to pursue its policy of pan-Pacifi c 
cooperation and cultural renaissance, 
its political foundation in the assembly 
became more and more shaky. Months 
before, insurmountable tensions had 
developed within the bare majority 
upld coalition, and in April 2006, 
Temaru’s main coalition partner Emile 
Ver naudon left the coalition and allied 
himself with the pro-French Tahoeraa 
opposition of former President Gaston 
Flosse. Temaru, however, had tem-
porarily saved his assembly majority 
through a makeshift alliance with four 
opportunistic representatives from the 
Tuamotu and Marquesas islands, who 
were originally elected on a Taho-
eraa list in 2004 but had frequently 
changed sides. Due to the unreliability 
of the four representatives, Temaru’s 
new majority proved to be very 
unstable. In October and November, 
threats of a new political switch were 
expressed by the four, subsequently 
known as “Islanders,” and by late 
November it was unclear who held the 
majority (TP, 22 Nov 2006; TPM, Dec 
2006). However, after long debates 
and delays, the budget for 2007 was 
fi nally passed on 7 December with the 
votes of the upld, including the four 
“Islanders,” so that the government’s 
majority appeared to be once more 
secured (TP, 7 Dec 2006).
Only a few days later, the opposi-
tion fi led a motion of censure. Sur-
prisingly, the motion was passed on 
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13 December, with a bare majority 
of twenty-nine votes, making it clear 
that two of the “Islanders” had indeed 
changed sides again, while the two 
Fetia Api representatives had given up 
their neutrality and joined the opposi-
tion (TP, 13 Dec 2006). In the follow-
ing two weeks, while Temaru’s govern-
ment remained in offi ce as a caretaker 
administration, a new majority coali-
tion under the name of “Autonomist 
platform” was formed, comprising 
Flosse’s Tahoeraa, Vernaudon’s Ai‘a 
Api, Jean-Christophe Bouissou’s Rau-
tahi (which had split from Tahoeraa), 
and the four “Islanders.” As both 
Flosse and his son-in-law and desig-
nated successor Edouard Fritch were 
unacceptable to the smaller coalition 
partners, Bora Bora Mayor Gaston 
Tong Sang, who had been lands minis-
ter under Flosse, was designated as the 
new majority’s presidential candidate 
(pir, 21 Dec 2007). 
On 26 December, Tong Sang was 
elected to be the new president with 
a majority of 31 votes, against 26 for 
Temaru. Besides the members of the 
new coalition, the two representatives 
of Fetia Api had also voted for Tong 
Sang. In his inaugural speech, the new 
president promised to consolidate the 
country’s fi nancial situation and coop-
erate more constructively with the 
French government (NT, 27 Dec 2006; 
DT, 27 Dec 2006; l’Hebdo, 28 Dec 
2006). Temaru, on the other hand, 
denounced the change of govern-
ment, which he attributed to a con-
spiracy directed from Paris designed 
to sabotage his administration (Fenua 
Info, 19 Dec 2006; NT, 27 Dec 2006; 
DT, 27 Dec 2006). Some upld mem-
bers also maintained that behind the 
formal leadership of Tong Sang, it was 
actually Gaston Flosse who pulled the 
strings (To‘ere, 21 Dec 2006). 
The new president, born to a Chi-
nese-Polynesian family on Bora Bora, 
received an engineer’s diploma in 
France and headed the municipality of 
his home island since 1989. Within the 
Tahoeraa party he was considered to 
be a rational technocrat (DT, 27 Dec 
2007). 
Three days after his election, Tong 
Sang presented his cabinet of fi fteen 
ministers. Temauri Foster, Mayor 
of Hao atoll and leader of the four 
“Islanders,” was appointed vice 
president and minister for Munici-
pal Development. Seven ministers 
were from Tahoeraa, most of them 
former ministers under Flosse, includ-
ing Teva Rohfritsch (Economy and 
Labor), Armelle Merceron (Finance), 
Tearii Alpha (Education), Jules Ienfa 
(Health), Madeleine Brémond (Social 
and Family Affairs and Housing), and 
Frédéric Riveta (Agriculture). Interest-
ing to note was the absence of Gaston 
Flosse and most of his inner circle. 
Also striking was the overrepresenta-
tion of the “Islanders,” with four cabi-
net ministers—besides Vice President 
Foster, there were Moehau Teriitahi 
(Outer Island Development), Louis 
Frébault (Equipment), and Michel Yip 
(Postal Services, Telecommunications, 
and Pearl Farming)—and of the two 
small coalition parties with two min-
isters each: Maina Sage (Tourism and 
Environment) and Moana Blanchard 
(Transportation) for Rautahi; Nata-
cha Taurua (Culture) and Clarenntz 
Vernaudon (Youth and Sports) for 
Ai‘a Api. The “Islanders” had thus 
played the political power game very 
successfully. Beginning as Tahoeraa 
backbenchers, within two years they 
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rose to become the “kingmakers” in 
the assembly and received leading 
positions in the new cabinet (DT, 
30 Dec 2007). 
This pattern of opportunistic 
behavior by the “Islanders” led to 
strong criticism among the population. 
In more general terms, it was pointed 
out that the outer islands were over-
represented in the new cabinet in com-
parison to Tahiti (where more than 
70 percent of the population live). 
Besides that, within a few days of 
the appointment of the new cabinet, 
tensions developed within Tahoeraa, 
between the hard core of Flosse fol-
lowers and the rest of the party. At 
the fi rst assembly session of the New 
Year on 11 January, the new govern-
ment lacked a majority because Flosse 
and two other Tahoeraa representa-
tives were absent. The upld therefore 
immediately fi led a motion of censure 
against Tong Sang, but it was eventu-
ally defeated (TPM, Feb 2007; TP, 
18 Jan 2007). 
The turning of the year thus 
marked, for the time being, the end 
of the barely two-year-long politi-
cal experiment of “Taui” (change) 
under Temaru’s leadership. This was 
regarded with mixed feelings. Most 
people seemed to be generally disap-
pointed with politics and showed 
neither grief nor joy about the change 
of government. While there was a 
degree of discontent regarding the 
return of the Tahoeraa after the previ-
ous experience of almost twenty years 
of increasingly corrupt rule by Flosse, 
the initial euphoria for Temaru’s 
“Taui” policy had also begun to fade 
away. Even though Temaru is indeed 
one of the few local politicians to have 
a true vision for the country’s future, 
his government undertook only a 
few concrete steps to implement this 
vision. Further, despite the promise to 
break with the system of nepotism and 
corruption established under Flosse, 
many upld government offi cials had 
engaged in similar activities. In addi-
tion, Temaru’s plans to lead the coun-
try into independence were regularly 
attacked by the opposition, and many 
people were infl uenced by their pro-
French propaganda. Unfortunately, 
most upld politicians failed to rigor-
ously uphold their moral standards 
and implement their political visions.
After their initial attempt to oust 
the Tong Sang government proved 
unsuccessful, the now opposition 
upld announced that it would still 
continue to do whatever it could to 
get the new government, which they 
considered illegitimate, removed from 
offi ce. For several consecutive weeks 
during late January and February, 
several hundred Temaru followers 
held weekly demonstrations against 
Tong Sang, demanding his resigna-
tion. The reason for the protests was 
an ongoing judicial inquiry against 
Tong Sang, who as Flosse’s minister 
of land affairs had been involved in a 
corruption affair in the early 2000s. 
At one of the protest events, Temaru 
argued that ethical standards require a 
politician to at least temporarily resign 
from offi ce during a judicial inquiry 
(TP, 31 Jan, 7 Feb 2007). Temaru 
also expressed his hope that Social-
ist candidate Ségolène Royal might 
win the upcoming French presidential 
elections, and subsequently his party 
campaigned vigorously for her. This 
was something completely new, as 
Tavini Huiraatira used to boycott 
French presidential elections. 
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In early January, Tong Sang trav-
eled to France to meet President 
Jacques Chirac and other French 
government offi cials in order to revive 
relations with Paris that had cooled 
down under Temaru (TP, 16 Jan 
2007). That the new French Poly-
nesian president was able to get an 
appointment with Chirac barely two 
weeks after his election, while Temaru 
had had to wait more than a year for 
such a meeting, clearly confi rmed that 
Paris was politically biased toward 
Papeete. Tong Sang was also able to 
successfully lobby the French Parlia-
ment, and on 24 January the National 
Assembly voted to change the election 
system of French Polynesia by delet-
ing the one-third-of-seats bonus. This 
provision had been inserted into the 
new organic law of French Polynesia 
in 2004 at the request of Flosse, but 
in effect it had helped Temaru win the 
2004 and 2005 elections. The modi-
fi cation was confi rmed by the French 
Senate and validated by the Constitu-
tional Council in mid-February (TPM, 
Feb and March 2007).
In March 2007, the struggle over 
nuclear follow-up resumed. The 
French delegate for nuclear safety, 
Marcel Jurien de la Gravière, went to 
Tahiti to present an offi cial report by 
the French Ministry of Defense on the 
radiological impact of nuclear testing 
(TP, 6 March 2007). The report admits 
some negative effects, but continues to 
downplay their signifi cance. Moruroa 
e Tatou strongly criticized the report. 
The Tong Sang administration, how-
ever, had weakened the position of 
the test victim association by replac-
ing anti-nuclear assembly members 
and Moruroa e Tatou members 
with bureaucrats in the government-
affi liated Orientation Council for the 
Follow-up on the Consequences of 
Nuclear Testing (coscen), established 
by the Temaru government (TP, 9 
March 2007; TPM, April 2007).
While the new government proved 
to be an obedient puppet of Paris 
regarding the nuclear question, it 
remained very unstable. On 1 March 
the “Islanders” had founded their 
own party, called Te Niu Hau Mana-
hune (the foundation of democracy). 
Together with the two other minor 
coalition parties, Rautahi and Ai‘a 
Api, they created a third parliamentary 
group named “Polynésiens Ensemble” 
(Polynesians Together) in the assembly 
(TP, 1 March 2007). This proved to 
be another destabilizing factor for the 
majority. Several members of Taho-
reaa broke away from their party and 
joined the new group, while Flosse 
clashed with some of the “Islanders” 
over budgetary issues (TP, 23 and 24 
March 2007). 
On 12 April, the deep rift within 
the ruling coalition became even more 
apparent when two pro-government 
candidates were presented for the 
yearly reelection of the assembly’s 
Speaker. While Edouard Fritch repre-
sented Tahoeraa, Hiro Tefaarere (an 
ex-upld representative who is now 
part of Ai‘a Api) was the candidate of 
the Polynésiens Ensemble group. In the 
fi rst round of the election, upld can-
didate Antony Geros received a major-
ity of 26 votes, against 21 for Fritch, 
8 for Tefaarere, and 2 abstentions (the 
two Fetia Api representatives). In a 
second round, Fritch received only 18 
votes and Tefaarere 11, while Geros’s 
votes remained constant. In a fi nal 
runoff, Fritch received a majority of 
only 28 votes against 27 for Geros and 
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2 abstentions. One of the government 
representatives had apparently voted 
for Geros rather than for Fritch (TP, 
12 Apr 2007). 
While the upld opposition stood 
strong and united, President Tong 
Sang’s coalition government experi-
enced a serious crisis only four months 
after his inauguration. Apparently, 
a power struggle was being fought 
between Gaston Flosse’s Tahoeraa 
core group and a heterogeneous 
group of younger, more opportu-
nistic politicians who stood behind 
Tong Sang. The latter group was on 
the winning side, at least it seemed 
so at fi rst. While the Flosse faction 
had won some points by electing 
Fritch as the assembly speaker, more 
representatives defected to the other 
faction. Immediately after Fritch’s 
election, three Tahoeraa representa-
tives from the Leeward Islands, Tong 
Sang’s home archipelago, entered the 
Polynésiens Ensemble group, and were 
subsequently threatened with exclu-
sion from Tahoeraa. Rumors spread 
regarding the possible resignation or 
exclusion from the party of even Presi-
dent Tong Sang himself  (TPM, May 
2006; TP, 16 April 2007).
The next signifi cant political event 
was the French presidential elections 
of 21 April and 5 May. Winning can-
didate Nicolas Sarkozy from Chirac’s 
right-wing party, Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire (ump), was also 
leading the votes in French Polynesia. 
In the fi rst election round, he received 
45.23 percent of the votes (31.18 per-
cent in France), against 41.68 percent 
for Ségolène Royal (25.87 percent in 
France). The third place was claimed 
by the liberal François Bayrou with 
7.15 percent (18.57 percent in France). 
The nine other candidates received less 
than 2 percent of French Polynesia’s 
votes each. In the runoff election, Sar-
kozy barely won with 51.89 percent 
(53.06 percent nationally) against 
48.11 percent for Royal. At 69.12 
percent at the fi rst round and 74.81 
percent at the runoff, the participation 
rates in the territory were unusually 
high for a French presidential election 
(French Ministry of Interior Web site; 
TP, 22 April and 6 May 2007). 
While few local voters take an 
interest in metropolitan French 
politics, French presidential elections 
have been used by local politicians 
to measure their own infl uence by 
endorsing one of the candidates (TPM, 
Feb and March 2007). In this case, all 
the pro-French parties of the ruling 
coalition supported Sarkozy, as he was 
the candidate of Chirac’s ump party 
(TP, 18 April 2007). The upld fi rmly 
supported Royal, and lead a march of 
5,000 people in her favor before the 
election, hoping that her administra-
tion would adopt a more construc-
tive attitude toward Tahiti than the 
strongly partisan Chirac administra-
tion (TP, 14 April 2007). The result of 
the two election rounds shows that the 
polarization of the political landscape 
into two almost equal camps had 
consolidated, while the parties of the 
“third way,” Fetia Api and No Oe E 
Te Nunaa, which supported Bayrou, 
were in decline. 
It was interesting to note that 
Sarkozy was not leading the runoff 
vote in all municipalities of Tahiti, 
and was leading in only a few of the 
outer islands. In the Windward Islands 
(Tahiti and Moorea), Royal had the 
lead not only in the municipality of 
Faaa (where Temaru is the mayor) but 
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also in Hitiaa O Te Ra, Papara, Paea, 
and Moorea. As for the outer islands, 
Royal lead the vote in the Leeward, 
western Tuamotu, and Marquesas 
islands. Tahoeraa had won in all these 
archipelagos at the last territorial elec-
tions in 2004 that brought the upld 
to power. In the 2005 by-elections, 
which reinforced the upld majority, 
the outer islands did not participate. 
That the same islands now voted for 
the candidate supported by upld 
might be seen as an indication that 
the upld has now established itself 
on the outer islands as well. Interest-
ingly, Royal led the vote even on Tong 
Sang’s home island of Bora Bora (TP, 
6 May 2007). 
The Pro-French forces were vic-
torious again when the two deputies 
of French Polynesia in the French 
National Assembly were elected on 2 
and 16 June. In the Western constitu-
ency (western half of Tahiti island, 
Moorea, the Leeward and Austral 
islands), the Tahoeraa incumbent and 
Papeete Mayor Michel Buillard led 
the vote in the fi rst round with 41.50 
percent, slightly ahead of his upld 
challenger, ex-President Oscar Temaru 
(40.16 percent), the difference being 
only 700 votes. On Tahiti and Moorea 
islands as well as on some of the outer 
islands, Temaru led the vote. Jean-
Christophe Bouissou (Rautahi) scored 
third with 8.21 percent, ahead of 
Nicole Bouteau (No Oe E Te Nunaa) 
with 7.24 percent. In the Eastern 
Constituency (eastern half of Tahiti, 
Tuamotu-Gambier, and Marquesas 
Islands), the Tahoeraa candidate and 
Papara Mayor Bruno Sandras led the 
vote with 36.98 percent, followed by 
upld candidate Pierre Frébault (for-
mer minister of labor under Temaru) 
with 29.73 percent. Incumbent Béa-
trice Vernaudon, who had been elected 
in 2002 for Tahoeraa but had declared 
herself to stand above partisan divi-
sions in 2004, received only the third 
position with 33.53 percent (TP, 2, 3 
and 5 June 2007). 
In the runoff election, Buillard won 
the western constituency with 54.07 
percent against Temaru with 45.93 
percent, and Sandras did likewise in 
the eastern constituency with 56.96 
percent against Frébault with 43.04 
percent. The participation rate was 
considerably lower than at the presi-
dential elections, with only slightly 
over 50 percent in the fi rst round, and 
slightly over 60 percent in the runoff. 
The strong increase in votes for the 
Tahoeraa candidates in the second 
round was due to the endorsement by 
Bouissou and other minority candi-
dates. As a result, the victorious can-
didates led the vote nearly everywhere 
in the western constituency, except 
for Temaru’s municipality of Faaa and 
the Austral islands of Raivavae and 
Rimatara. In the east, Frébault led the 
vote in two districts on Tahiti, and on 
some of the Tuamotu islands, but also 
in the Marquesas Archipelago (TP, 
 16 June 2007). 
Unsurprisingly, the governing 
coalition saw the election results as a 
popular legitimization of the change of 
government in December. At the same 
time, however, the tensions between 
the two factions of Tahoeraa (Flosse 
versus Tong Sang) surfaced again very 
prominently, as Tong Sang refused to 
offi cially endorse Sandras (a Flosse 
protégé) in the eastern constituency 
(TP, 5 June 2007). Sandras’s election 
victory was thus seen by Flosse as a 
confi rmation of his leadership and 
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a rejection of Tong Sang. The upld 
was disappointed by the results, but 
Temaru remarked that it was clear 
that his party had a stable electorate 
of at least 40 percent, and that their 
defeat was only due to the cooperation 
of all local pro-French forces as well 
as the massive vote of French settlers 
for the Tahoeraa candidates (DT, 17 
June 2007; TPM, July 2007).
Meanwhile, the crisis within Tong 
Sang’s majority continued, when on 
5 June, Minister of Pearl Farming, 
Postal Services, and Telecommunica-
tions Michel Yip resigned, denouncing 
irregularities and corruption among 
his fellow ministers from the outer 
islands. His portfolios were redistrib-
uted among President Tong Sang and 
Vice President Foster (TP, 6 June 2007; 
TPM, July 2007). Subsequently, the 
upld fi led another motion of censure 
on 19 June (pir, 20 June 2007), and 
while Yip added his vote to those 
of the upld, it was defeated in the 
assembly on 23 June.
Tong Sang’s government seems to 
be in a permanent state of instabil-
ity. Both the upld and Flosse’s group 
apparently want to provoke the 
dissolution of the assembly and new 
elections. However on 22 June, new 
French Minister for Overseas Territo-
ries Christian Estrosi stated there will 
be no dissolution before the regular 
elections of 2009 (TPM, July 2007; 
NT, 27 June 2007). 
The review period ended with 
the celebration of the controversial 
autonomy holiday of 29 June, which 
was reinstated by Tong Sang and 
celebrated at the presidential palace 
with great pomp. The Order of Tahiti 
Nui, created by Flosse but abolished 
under Temaru, was reactivated and 
medals distributed. Tong Sang and 
his coalition partners gave speeches in 
which they praised the dependence of 
their country on France and expressed 
their gratitude to King Pomare V for 
signing the convention of annexation. 
The president then demonstrated his 
ignorance by claiming that, thanks to 
France, Tahiti had the only university 
in the Pacifi c, bluntly ignoring uni-
versities in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
and Sämoa that were all founded 
well before the University of French 
Polynesia. In a press conference on 
the same day, Temaru and leading 
members of his party denounced 
the celebration and talked about the 
true history of colonization, and the 
background of the 1880 treaty (TPM, 
July 2007; DT, 30 June 2007). It was 
interesting to observe that Flosse and 
his Tahoeraa core group were absent 
from Tong Sang’s celebration. Flosse 
had also stopped publicly denouncing 
Temaru for quite some time, which 
has been interpreted by observers as 
an indication that he might eventually 
break apart the majority and strike a 
deal with the upld. 
lorenz gonschor
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Ma¯ori Issues
While political tension increased for 
Mäori during the year, there was 
also great sadness. Like our Tongan 
and Samoan relations we lost sig-
nifi cant leaders. In August 2006 the 
Tainui confederation of tribes lost 
their arikinui (paramount chief) of 
forty years, Dame Te Atairangikähu. 
As the hereditary leader of Tainui’s 
Kingitanga movement, she was their 
queen. Tainui established the Kingi-
tanga in the 1850s in an attempt to 
stop the confi scation of their territo-
ries by European immigrants. They 
are the only tribal confederation in 
New Zealand to have established a 
British-style monarchy, and although 
the Kingitanga does not include most 
iwi (tribal groupings), it nevertheless 
enjoys widespread support and respect 
within Maoridom. Thus despite the 
fact that Dame Te Ata held no con-
stitutional position in New Zealand 
law, she was often referred to as “the 
Mäori Queen.” She was a strong 
fi gure in Mäori politics and a staunch 
supporter of Mäori sports and culture 
(Bennion 2006 [Aug], 1; [Oct], 1; 
Mana, Oct–Nov 2006).
In September 2006, Ngäti Whätua 
lost their paramount chief, Emeritus 
Professor Sir Hugh Käwharu. He 
was the chair of the Ngäti Whätua o 
Öräkei Mäori Trust Board for more 
than twenty years and was the major 
force behind the Ngäti Whätua Treaty 
of Waitangi claims to the Auckland 
area. His determination to break 
through government mean-spiritedness 
and intransigence in order to settle 
the claims saw him taking on a hugely 
punishing workload after he retired as 
professor and head of the Department 
of Mäori Studies at the University 
of Auckland in 1993. He signed an 
agreement in principle toward settle-
ment of those claims shortly before his 
death (Bennion 2006 [Oct], 2). 
In April 2007, veteran Mäori actor 
and fi lmmaker Don Selwyn, one of 
New Zealand’s most outstanding tele-
vision and fi lm producers and direc-
tors, passed away. He was Ngäti Kurï, 
Te Aupöuri, and Ngäti Kahu of the 
Far North. His greatest masterpiece 
was Te Tangata Whai Rawa o Wëniti: 
The Mäori Merchant of Venice, the 
fi lm version of Shakespeare’s famous 
play, which had been translated into 
Mäori by Pei Te Hurinui Jones in 
1945 (Mäori Party 2007a).
On the political scene over the 
past year, the racist attitudes toward 
Mäori that continue to dominate the 
New Zealand Parliament resulted 
in on going and increasing tension 
between Mäori and the government on 
many issues. Mäori have once again 
had to resort to protest actions, as the 
government repeatedly denied us our 
legal rights. This time, however, coor-
dinated protests across the country in 
response to refusals to return stolen 
lands resulted in the government’s 
backing down and calling a tempo-
rary truce on that particular issue. For 
apart from strong judicial backing, 
particularly from the Waitangi Tribu-
nal, and international condemnation 
from the United Nations (Staven hagen 
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2006), the presence of the small but 
very effective independent Mäori 
voice in Parliament, the Mäori Party, 
is ensuring that Mäori issues are no 
longer determined solely according to 
the racist whim of the major parties in 
the House. 
The area that continued to be 
the major source of the tension was 
the settlement of Treaty of Waitangi 
claims. British immigrants, who settled 
New Zealand in large numbers begin-
ning in the 1850s, have long sought 
to get rid of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
For over a century they simply ignored 
the treaty, and the courts sanctioned 
their behavior. But in the aftermath 
of World War II, international agree-
ments outlawing racial discrimination, 
along with highly visible and embar-
rassing Mäori protests, forced the 
New Zealand government to estab-
lish the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975. 
The brief of the tribunal is to inquire 
into Mäori claims of breaches of the 
treaty. Initially, the government of 
the day did not expect the tribunal to 
hear many claims, meet often, or cost 
much (Oliver 1991, 9–10). But by the 
1990s the tribunal was building an 
extremely bleak and ever-expanding 
record of extensive and serious atroci-
ties committed against Mäori. In an 
effort to limit its liabilities in the area, 
the national government announced 
in 1994 that it wanted to settle the 
claims. It accepted responsibility for 
the atrocities and was prepared to 
compensate Mäori—but the money 
set aside for the settlements would be 
restricted to an arbitrarily set nz$1 
billion, and the government would 
avoid returning any land if it could get 
away with it.
Since 1994 Mäori have fought 
against this policy, which was drawn 
up unilaterally by the government 
with no Mäori input, and is deeply 
racist in intent. Even in the face of 
ongoing and strident Mäori, judi-
cial, and international criticism, no 
National or Labour government has 
been prepared either to amend the 
policy or to withdraw it and start 
again. As more and more claimants 
are being bullied into accepting pitiful 
settlements, it is now becoming clear 
that the primary aim of the policy is to 
get Mäori around the country to agree 
that they should extinguish rather 
than settle their Treaty of Waitangi 
claims. Furthermore, in doing so, they 
are also effectively agreeing to a sys-
tematic extinguishment of the Treaty 
of Waitangi itself. 
Legislation is currently before 
Parliament to remove all references to 
the principles of the Treaty of Wai-
tangi from all legislation, and to date 
this has had the support of the present 
coalition government. To try to mini-
mize international backlash, the New 
Zealand government joined Austra-
lia, Canada, and the United States in 
November 2006 in opposing the adop-
tion of the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
Mäori have supported and worked on 
the declaration for twenty years.
The Treaty of Waitangi Claims 
Settlement policy is designed to leg-
islatively absolve the Crown of any 
and all liability and responsibility for 
its innumerable historical breaches of 
the Treaty of Waitangi and the theft of 
more than 90 percent of the country’s 
lands and resources from Mäori. The 
government does this by bullying 
select groups of Mäori, purportedly 
representing “large natural group-
ings” of many thousands of other 
Mäori, into agreements that are legally 
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binding and unchallengeable. The 
primary aim of the agreements is to 
provide (1) full and legally unchal-
lengeable removal of legal liability for 
all breaches of the Treaty of Wai tangi, 
both identifi ed and unidentifi ed, 
committed in a particular geographic 
area prior to 1992; (2) full and legally 
unchallengeable acceptance by the 
iwi of all discriminatory legislation, 
including the Foreshore and Seabed 
Act 2004, along with all assertions 
of Crown authority, dominance, and 
sovereignty over Mäori; and (3) full 
and legally unchallengeable acceptance 
that the iwi has relinquished all their 
sovereign rights and authority over 
the identifi ed geographic area to the 
Crown.
In exchange for that agreement the 
Crown is prepared to make an apol-
ogy for the breaches committed prior 
to 1992 (but not to stop committing 
further breaches) and to transfer a 
few acres of land. And while money 
is always mentioned as being part of 
settlements, if claimants want land 
returned they must use the money 
offered (and often borrow more as 
well) to buy the land from the Crown. 
As one would expect, the policy has 
caused huge divisions and strife within 
iwi. The Crown actively and openly 
fosters and exploits such divisions as it 
moves on relentlessly to achieve maxi-
mum implementation of its policy.
Of course, protection of Mäori 
from all of these situations is presently 
guaranteed by the Treaty of Wai tangi. 
The authoritative Mäori version 
promises that the Crown shall have 
governance over its own subjects only, 
that Mäori sovereignty is recognized 
and upheld, and that Mäori have 
the rights of all British citizens. The 
courts have repeatedly confi rmed that 
the treaty is the country’s founding 
document. Had the Crown been able 
to control the rapacious greed of Brit-
ish immigrants in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, it would not now 
be faced with remedying the wrongs as 
well as addressing the racism that has 
been allowed to develop and become 
deeply entrenched in the Päkehä 
psyche. Mäori have made it very clear 
that delaying remedies to the situation 
will not make it go away. And neither 
can legislative sleights of hand ever 
extinguish the Treaty of Waitangi.
Since mid-2006 the Crown has 
been dealing with twenty settlements. 
The Ngäti Mutunga Settlement Bill 
was enacted in November. It provides 
nz$14.9 million for Ngäti Mutunga 
to buy back some of the 150,000 acres 
the Crown had stolen from them. The 
land alone has an estimated monetary 
value of nz$5.19 billion (based on 
the nz$34,545 per acre paid to a 
Päkehä who had his land confi scated 
for Te Röroa’s treaty claims)—mak-
ing the settlement payment equivalent 
to less than 0.3 percent of the value 
of the land stolen. The Settlement Act 
acknowledges that the settlement does 
not compensate Ngäti Mutunga for 
the atrocities committed against them. 
These include the rape, murder, and 
illegal incarceration of large numbers 
of the iwi; the government’s waging 
war on them when they refused to 
give their lands to British settlers; the 
government’s confi scating all of their 
lands; and many other breaches of 
the Treaty of Waitangi that they have 
suffered and continue to suffer. But 
the act then says that Ngäti Mutunga 
has foregone full compensation, as its 
contribution to the “development of 
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New Zealand,” and thus the settle-
ment is full and fi nal (Bennion 2007 
[Feb], 6). During the House debate on 
the bill, the Mäori Party was scathing 
of the government’s mean-spiritedness, 
referring repeatedly to the Crown as 
“the thief.” Party members advised 
Ngäti Mutunga to revisit the settle-
ment in generations to come with a 
view to being properly compensated, 
and not to accept the “full and fi nal” 
stipulation of the Crown (Mäori Party 
2007b). 
Te Röroa’s Claims Settlement Bill 
came before the House in March 
2007. Te Röroa is a hapü of Ngäti 
Whatua who were left virtually land-
less. (A hapü is a grouping of a large 
number of extended families.) They 
fi rst complained to the Crown about 
breaches of the treaty one hundred 
sixty-fi ve years ago, yet for several 
generations they have been under 
relentless attack from Crown offi -
cials who denied them their legal and 
human rights. The Waitangi Tribunal 
upheld all their claims in 1992, detail-
ing countless atrocities perpetrated 
against them by the Crown (Waitangi 
Tribunal 1992). Te Röroa has been 
in negotiations for more than fi fteen 
years. The settlement is for nz$9.5 
million to be used to buy back from 
the Crown a small portion of Te 
Röroa’s land, now being used com-
mercially. Extensive wähi tapu (sacred 
sites) were stolen from them, and two 
thousand acres of these are returned in 
the settlement (Offi ce of Treaty Settle-
ments 2005).
In the House, the Mäori Party 
protested that Te Röroa had been 
subjected to “a negotiations process 
drafted by the Crown, and the Crown 
alone, based on false faith and dou-
ble-talk. It is a negotiations process 
that masquerades as being fair and 
reasonable in the circumstances but 
which, in fact, is anything but, and an 
empty insistence by the Crown that 
all settlements be full and fi nal—an 
insistence that will haunt this Cham-
ber long after it is cleared.” They 
warned that unfair settlements such 
as the one imposed in 2007 would be 
revisited by future generations. They 
also noted that considerably less land 
than what the Waitangi Tribunal had 
recommended was being returned to 
Te Röroa. They informed the House 
“that an apology and a return of less 
than 3 percent of the claim value 
pepper-potted throughout the tribal 
homeland of Te Röroa will simply not 
suffi ce” (Bennion 2007 [March], 6, 7).
In June 2006, Ngäti Whätua ki 
Öräkei hapü signed an agreement in 
principle to settle their claims to the 
Auckland isthmus. It agreed to vest 
three volcanic cones and land around 
Pürewa Creek in the hapü, but the 
lands are to be managed jointly by the 
hapü and the Auckland City Council 
with the council controlling the funds. 
The settlement is for nz$8 million, to 
be used as partial payment for up to 
nz$80 million of Ministry of Defence 
lands at Devonport—which they can 
buy from the Crown, provided they 
lease them back to the Crown and 
the Crown pays no rent for thirty 
years (Bennion 2006 [June], 8). The 
agreement came under serious threat 
when six other hapü with claims 
over the same area took the matter to 
the Waitangi Tribunal for an urgent 
hearing to prevent their claims being 
extinguished by such a settlement. The 
hearings took place in March 2007. 
The Offi ce of Treaty Settlements, 
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which manages negotiations for the 
Crown, came under severe criticism 
from the tribunal when it was revealed 
that, in addition to wrongfully treat-
ing claimants and fomenting divisions 
among the iwi of Auckland, they had 
withheld crucial evidence from the 
tribunal during the inquiry and misled 
the tribunal (Waitangi Tribunal 2007, 
101). 
In September 2006, the Te Arawa 
Lakes Settlement Bill was enacted. 
The lakes in the central North Island 
include Lake Rotorua and have been 
severely polluted by farm runoff and 
sewage disposal. The nz$10 million 
settlement returns the lakebeds to 
Te Arawa, leaving them to consider 
a cleanup that is estimated to cost 
nz$200 million, even though Te 
Arawa is specifi cally not liable for 
the pollution. The settlement extends 
Crown theft of Mäori assets in that 
it claims ownership not only of the 
water in the lakes but also the air-
space above them. (The term “Crown 
stratum” is currently being used to 
describe the redefi ned space above 
the lakebed.) In the House during the 
debate on this bill, the Mäori Party 
tabled a report on Mäori experiences 
of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement 
negotiations that demonstrates strong 
and universal condemnation of the 
process by claimants. Once again the 
Mäori Party warned that these settle-
ments cannot be full and fi nal and will 
be revisited.
Attempts by the government to 
force a settlement of a portion of the 
huge central North Island forestry 
claims relating to the Kaingaroa for-
est and other lands around Rotorua 
triggered a series of court actions. Of 
direct relevance to these claims is the 
Crown Forestry Rental Trust, which 
was set up in 1990 to hold forestry 
rental money in trust pending success-
ful claims to forestry lands. The trust 
now holds well over nz$400 million, 
of which almost nz$190 million is for 
the Kaingaroa forest. On top of that 
the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989 
provides for the transfer of Crown 
forest land, plus compensation to 
Mäori once their claims to the land 
have been upheld by the Waitangi 
Tribunal. Claims to the central North 
Island, including the Kaingaroa forest, 
have been before the tribunal for some 
time and the tribunal issued its report 
upholding the claims in June 2007. 
In a truly staggering example of 
arrogance and deceit the Crown man-
aged to persuade part of the Te Arawa 
confederation of iwi, who are one of a 
very large number of claimants to the 
Kaingaroa forest, to settle Te Arawa’s 
historical claims by giving over to the 
Crown nz$40.985 million in forestry 
rentals set aside for the Mäori owners 
of the lands. In addition, the Crown 
persuaded them to use the remainder 
of their rental money plus another 
nz$8 million (which they have to 
borrow from elsewhere) to buy from 
the Crown the land that is rightfully 
theirs under the Crown Forest Assets 
Act 1989. The Crown stands to make 
a nz$90 million profi t if they pass leg-
islation to settle the claims along these 
lines. It will be able to do so after hav-
ing convinced the claimants to enter 
into an agreement that allows the 
Crown to become a benefi ciary of the 
Crown Forestry Rental Trust (at pres-
ent only those with successful claims 
to the land can be benefi ciaries of 
the trust). The claimants also have to 
agree to the Crown’s selling the land 
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in question to Mäori (land that the 
tribunal is likely to fi nd belongs to the 
claimants and other Mäori anyway). 
The Federation of Mäori Authorities 
and the New Zealand Mäori Coun-
cil are currently pursuing the matter 
through the courts. The Waitangi 
Tribunal has issued a strongly worded 
report saying that it cannot endorse 
the settlement and that it has grave 
concerns over the potential negative 
impacts on  the interests of other iwi 
with claims on the same land. 
However, in the Far North, one 
iwi, Ngäti Kahu, took a very differ-
ent approach. They withdrew from 
negotiations after the Crown started 
to sell off part of Ngäti Kahu’s Ran-
giputa block, currently being used by 
the government’s farming enterprise, 
Landcorp. In 1997, the tribunal had 
indicated that it would make binding 
recommendations in order to return 
Rangiputa to Ngäti Kahu if negotia-
tions with the government failed. Since 
1997, successive governments have 
threatened Ngäti Kahu that if they do 
seek binding recommendations under 
the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 
the government will repeal the act. 
Once negotiations with the Crown 
had ceased, Ngäti Kahu moved on to 
the land, repossessing it. Their stance 
started a chain reaction as other iwi, 
whose lands were also being sold by 
Landcorp, took similar action. A pro-
test march in the Far North town of 
Kaitäia in support of the repossession 
was the biggest the town has ever seen. 
In the House the Mäori Party relent-
lessly pursued the government over the 
issue, calling on all iwi to follow suit 
and repossess their lands. After two 
weeks the government backed down 
and temporarily withdrew the lands 
from sale. Each of the iwi concerned 
is now pursuing binding recommenda-
tions through the Waitangi Tribunal, 
a mechanism that allows the tribunal 
to order the Crown to return State 
Owned Enterprise land, Crown Forest 
lands, and certain other Crown lands 
to their Mäori owners. 
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Rapa Nui
The year under review marked the 
beginning of great political change on 
Rapa Nui. In a long process initiated 
by the Chilean president, a draft bill 
for an organic law providing a spe-
cial political status for the island was 
elaborated, while the Chilean constitu-
tion was fi nally amended to create the 
administrative category of a special 
territory. On the local political land-
scape, there was a shift away from the 
local elite at the election for the local 
Development Commission, with two 
opposition and pro-independence can-
didates receiving the highest numbers 
of votes. 
The period under review started 
with the loss of one of the most 
important political fi gures of the 
island’s recent history. In mid-August 
2006, veteran opposition and pro-
independence leader Juan Chávez 
passed away at age eighty-two (Rapa 
Nui resident Stephanie Pauly, pers 
comm, 13 March 2007). One of the 
cofounders of the Rapanui Council of 
Elders in the 1980s, Chávez had led 
various initiatives of resistance against 
the Chilean government, and since 
2001 he had been the president of the 
pro-independence Rapanui Parlia-
ment. He was also renowned as one of 
the island’s most culturally knowledge-
able koro (elders). At the time of this 
writing, no successor has been named 
to head the Rapanui Parliament, but 
within the months following Chávez’s 
death, the pro-independence forces 
consolidated themselves once more 
under its umbrella. 
At the same time, the controversy 
about a planned casino on the island 
was resolved in September 2006, 
when the Chilean authorities once 
again refused to grant permission, 
thus stopping the project indefi nitely. 
The reason for the refusal was the 
incompatibility of the juridical status 
of the island with Chilean gambling 
legislation. Also the nonexistence of 
income taxes on the island would have 
made it impossible for the Chilean 
fi scal authorities to track the earn-
ings of the casino (Noticias de Rapa 
Nui, Sept 2006). The casino project, 
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a joint venture between the Chilean 
company Grupo Martinez-am Hold-
ing and Rapanui entrepreneur Petero 
Riroroko, had stirred up passionate 
debates within the community. While 
it had the support of Mayor Petero 
Edmunds and Council of Elders 
President Alberto Hotus, former Gov-
ernor Enrique Pakarati had strongly 
opposed the project, along with 
Rapanui organizations on the Chilean 
continent, and apparently most of the 
local population. The demise of the 
plan was therefore greeted with much 
joy and relief on the island, while it 
represented a severe setback for the 
political ambitions of Edmunds and 
Hotus. 
Although there will be no gambling 
on the island, the tourism industry and 
the immigration of Chilean settlers 
continue to grow, leading to constant 
infrastructure problems such as traffi c 
jams and electricity blackouts (RNJ, 
Oct 2007). In November 2006, Chile’s 
Public Works Ministry announced 
that it would spend us$2.4 million on 
improving the road network in order 
to facilitate access from the capital 
Hanga Roa to Ovahe and Anakena 
beaches, and to some of the more 
remote moai (statues) for which the 
island is famous. It was announced 
that once the road network has been 
completed, Rapa Nui would have 
a forty-six-kilometer-long circuit, 
intended to attract more tourists to the 
island (Santiago Times, 12 Nov 2006). 
The main issue during the year, 
however, was the project for a special 
administrative statute for the island. 
Currently a municipality and a prov-
ince within the continental Chilean 
region of Valparaíso, Rapa Nui is 
supposed to become a special territory 
outside of the normal Chilean admin-
istrative system, and will be placed 
directly under the national govern-
ment in Santiago. The fi rst step toward 
achieving this new political status will 
be to change the Chilean constitution 
in order to create the administrative 
category of a special territory. Sec-
ond, an organic law must be passed 
to specify the administrative system 
in that territory. Debates regarding 
the new statute have been going on 
both locally and in Chile for years, 
and thus the parliamentary process 
has progressed very slowly. On 2 May 
2006, the Chilean Senate unanimously 
adopted the constitutional reform 
(Senate of Chile Web site, reviewed 19 
June 2006; subdere, 10 May 2007; 
RNJ, Oct 2006), but in order for it to 
become law, the Chamber of Deputies 
still had to vote on it. 
The organic law bill for a Special 
Statute, on the other hand, has so far 
not even been introduced in either 
house of Congress. An offi cial Special 
Statute proposal published in August 
2005 (Government of Chile 2005) 
stirred up much controversy, because 
only three local individuals—Mayor 
Edmunds, Elders Councilor Hotus, 
and then Governor Pakarati—were 
involved in its making. Rapanui 
opposition leaders had vigorously 
protested and demanded more popular 
input (Chávez and others 2005), while 
alternative proposals had been ignored 
by the Chilean authorities. 
However, new Chilean President 
Michelle Bachelet, inaugurated in 
March 2006, proved to be more atten-
tive to those concerns than the previ-
ous administration, and during a visit 
to the island in May 2006 she declared 
that she favored a new debate on the 
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project, with broad community par-
ticipation (Government of Chile 2006; 
subdere, 8 May 2006). While the 
2005 proposal was declared obsolete, 
a working group gathered community 
input over a nine-month period and a 
new bill was drafted (Governor Caro-
lina Hotu, pers comm, 17 July 2006). 
On 1 December 2006, the Undersec-
retariat for Regional Development 
within the Chilean Ministry of the 
Interior held a workshop on the stat-
ute project on the island (subdere, 4 
Dec 2006), and a Chilean government 
delegation led by Undersecretary Clau-
dia Serrano traveled to the island for 
a two-day fi nal seminar from 24 to 26 
January 2007, organized by Governor 
Carolina Hotu. The results of the nine-
month working group were publicly 
discussed at the seminar—with the 
participation of both the local authori-
ties and the general public—and the 
conclusions were presented to the 
undersecretary for further elaboration 
with the president (subdere, 24 and 
26 Jan 2007). The process of drafting 
the bill has thus become much more 
transparent, with the local opposition 
now willing to participate (Rapanui 
Parliament member Inés Teave, pers 
comm, 12 July 2007).
The draft bill, currently still in the 
making, can be summarized as follows 
in its latest version as of July 2007 
(Government of Chile 2007a): An 
introduction recognizes the Rapanui 
as an indigenous people with a special 
ethnic, social, and cultural identity 
(article 1). While the bill reinforces the 
sovereignty of Chile by citing the 1888 
annexation document signed by the 
local chiefs, the title of the Rapanui 
population to all the land of the island 
is clearly recognized, and any title cur-
rently claimed by the Chilean state is 
classifi ed as title held in trust on behalf 
of the Rapanui people (article 3). 
The new administrative framework 
created by the bill would consist of 
a governor, a Rapanui Development 
Council, directors of the local gov-
ernment departments, the Council of 
Elders, and a Rapanui Development 
Corporation. The governor would be 
appointed by the Chilean president 
and must be ethnic Rapanui. As the 
Chilean State representative, he or she 
would direct all the responsibilities of 
the Chilean government on the island, 
and would be at the same level as an 
intendante (regional administrator) on 
the Chilean continent. The governor 
would also direct the local administra-
tion in collaboration with the Rapanui 
Development Council (articles 8–16). 
This council would be composed of 
the governor and six members elected 
for a four-year term by the native 
Rapanui community. The council 
would have the right to formulate 
development policies in all social, cul-
tural, and economic fi elds, similar to a 
regional council in Chile, and have a 
say in the attribution of funds within 
the local administration. The gover-
nor would have the power to veto its 
decisions within ten days, but the veto 
could be overridden by a two-thirds 
majority of the council (articles 17–28, 
30–33). The council would also have 
the authority to recommend to the 
Chilean president the removal of the 
governor (article 11g). 
The local government apparatus 
would be structured into fi ve depart-
ments (infrastructure, lands and 
resources, economic development, 
culture and education, planning and 
social affairs), each headed by a direc-
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tor appointed by the governor after 
being approved by the Development 
Council. Each department would exer-
cise the responsibilities of the respec-
tive national Chilean ministry or min-
istries on the island (articles 33–36). 
While the Rapanui governor’s offi ce 
and the Development Council would 
be within the budget of the Chilean 
Ministry of Interior (article 37), an 
investment fund would be established 
for local development projects (articles 
38–42). 
The Council of Elders, as a recog-
nized traditional institution represent-
ing each native family, would have a 
prominent function in the new admin-
istrative system, as it would have 
consultative authority on all matters 
involving the Rapanui cultural heri-
tage (article 29). It would also have an 
executive branch, called the Corpora-
tion for the Defense and Protection 
of the Rapanui Culture and Heritage 
(cdprch). This corporation would 
consist of fi ve members designated 
by the Council of Elders. It would 
have all the responsibilities currently 
exercised by the local offi ce of the 
National Corporation for Indigenous 
Development and some other Chilean 
government agencies concerned with 
cultural preservation (articles 43–44). 
The most important task of the 
corporation, however, would be the 
handling of land matters. The draft 
bill recognizes all the lands without 
a private Rapanui titleholder to be 
traditionally owned by the Rapanui 
community (article 45). The title to 
all of those lands, currently claimed 
by the Chilean state, would be trans-
ferred to the cdprch, including all the 
rights and assets currently held by the 
Chilean National Development Cor-
poration (corfo), which includes the 
valuable soils of the Vaitea state farm 
in the island’s interior, as well as the 
Hotel Hanga Roa, currently owned by 
a Chilean company (transitory articles 
1, 2, 5). In addition, the cdprch 
would also have the oversight over the 
island’s water reserves (article 47).
In conclusion, the bill would defi -
nitely reform the administrative system 
of Rapa Nui. It contains no refer-
ence to Valparaíso region; the island’s 
administrative relationship would be 
exclusively with Santiago. Most, if not 
all, Chilean government offi ces on the 
island that are currently dependent on 
various Santiago- or Valparaíso-based 
agencies would become centralized 
under the local administration. There 
is also strong cultural reference in the 
bill. For the fi rst time in a Chilean 
legal document, the name “Rapa Nui” 
would be used to refer to the island, 
though sometimes alongside the name 
“Easter Island.” It would also be the 
fi rst offi cial document to mention the 
Rapanui fl ag (article 12e), and the 
teaching of Rapanui language and cul-
ture would be made mandatory at all 
levels of the public education system 
(article 48). The bill also mentions the 
possibility of a future administrative 
division of the island conforming to 
the traditional clan districts (articles 
12v, 15i, 28h). 
On the other hand, however, the 
local chief executive would still not be 
elected locally but would continue to 
be appointed from Chile. The gover-
nor’s serving as both representative of 
the Chilean state and head of the local 
government might lead to confl icts of 
interest. Concerning the Council of 
Elders: If that institution is given an 
administrative function with substan-
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tial amounts of power, questions arise 
regarding how it will be composed 
and how it will function internally. 
The “Council of Elders” currently 
recognized by Chile consists of a fac-
tion led by Alberto Hotus, who claims 
council presidency for life, although 
the legitimacy of his claim is widely 
contested. If the council is to become 
an administrative agency, it ought to 
be reformed and democratized, but the 
draft bill does not address this issue. 
Also unclear is the future position and 
role of the currently existing munici-
pality. Its functions are not clarifi ed, 
but its mention several times in the 
draft bill seems to imply the continu-
ity of its existence. If that situation 
is maintained in the fi nal version, it 
would mean continuing the absurdity 
of having two parallel administrations 
(governor’s offi ce and municipal-
ity) for a community consisting of 
only one village with a few thousand 
inhabitants. In summary, one could 
say that in spite of several progressive 
elements, the draft bill would only 
restructure the Chilean administrative 
system rather than create a system of 
true internal autonomy comparable 
to that provided by the statutes of the 
French or US Pacifi c territories. 
One other burning issue in the 
debate on the special statute—the 
ongoing immigration of Chilean set-
tlers—was raised by many participants 
at the January seminar (subdere, 26 
Jan 2007), but no provision for regu-
lating immigration is included in the 
draft bill. The draft only promises fur-
ther discussion of that issue in parallel 
with the pursuit of the statute bill.
Meanwhile, on 5 June 2007, the 
Chilean Chamber of Deputies fi nally 
passed the constitutional reform by a 
vote of 100 to 1 (Informativo Provin-
cial, June 2007, 1st issue; subdere, 
5 June 2007). The reform was signed 
into law by President Bachelet on 27 
June (Government of Chile 2007b), 
thus creating Rapa Nui and the Juan 
Fernández Islands off the Chilean 
coast as Special Territories, to be gov-
erned according to organic laws for 
each territory. This cleared the way for 
the Special Statute bill to be debated 
and eventually passed in Congress. 
While the slow process of admin-
istrative reform continues, elections 
for the members of one of the exist-
ing political institutions, the Easter 
Island Development Commission 
(codeipa) were held on 10 June 
2007, with some surprising results. 
According to the 1993 Indigenous 
Law, the commission operates as a 
consultative institution on all matters 
concerning the economic, social, and 
cultural development of the indig-
enous Rapanui population, including 
land matters. The commission consists 
of fi ve elected ethnic Rapanui, seven 
representatives of Chilean state insti-
tutions, as well as the governor, the 
mayor, and the president of the Coun-
cil of Elders. At the 2007 elections, 
among 25 candidates, including all 5 
incumbents, the highest numbers of 
votes were won by 2 non-incumbent 
pro-independence activists, Mario 
Tuki and Raúl Teao, who received 248 
and 234 votes, respectively. Tuki and 
Teao have been known as outspoken 
land rights activists since the 1990s, 
and were coauthors of a 2003 report 
commissioned by the Chilean Histori-
cal Truth Commission, in which they 
denounced the Chilean takeover in 
1888 and argued that the island is 
still an independent kingdom (Tuki 
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and others 2003). Also newly elected 
was Luz Zasso Paoa with 152 votes, 
who became the fi rst female mem-
ber of the commission. Among the 
incumbents, Jorge Emilio Pont and 
Marcelo Ika, who is also a municipal 
councilor, were reelected with 195 and 
149 votes, respectively. Famed veteran 
community leader Alfonso Rapu, who 
led the 1964 popular uprising that 
ended arbitrary military rule over the 
island, and who was the island’s fi rst 
elected mayor in the 1960s, curiously 
missed being reelected, securing only 
109 votes. The two other incumbents, 
Rafael Tuki and Luis Pate, also missed 
reelection, each receiving fewer than 
100 votes (Informativo Provincial, 
June 2007, 1st issue; Resultados Elec-
ciones codeipa 2007). 
The election results seem to point, 
on the one hand, to a growing dissat-
isfaction on the part of the community 
with the local political elite (affi liated 
with the ruling Chilean center-left 
parties), which has been running local 
institutions for more than a decade, 
and on the other hand, to a rise of 
Rapanui nationalists. Most of the 
latter had also previously overcome 
their differences and reunited them-
selves under the Rapanui Parliament, 
whereas previously Tuki and Teao 
had led their own respective organiza-
tions. The leadership of Alberto Hotus 
in the Council of Elders is now more 
contested than ever, and Mario Tuki is 
likely to challenge him in an upcoming 
election (Alberto Hotus, radio inter-
view, broadcast 18 July 2007; Mario 
Tuki, public speech in the Rapanui 
Parliament, 20 July 2007). 
While great changes are being 
initiated in both political institutions 
and local politics, the island’s quality 
of life is being improved as well. A 
new hospital, promised by President 
Bachelet during her visit in May 2006 
(La Tercera, 6 May 2006), will fi nally 
be built. In June 2007, a model of the 
hospital was presented to the public 
by the governor and health offi cials 
from Chile (Informativo Provincial, 
June 2007, 2nd issue).
Finally, a rare occasion of interna-
tional publicity for Rapa Nui arose in 
late June, when in a campaign to name 
the new seven wonders of the world 
through online voting, the moai of 
Rapa Nui made it to the fi nal selec-
tion of the top fourteen. Not only did 
the local political leadership partici-
pate enthusiastically in campaigns for 
their island, but the competition also 
boosted Chilean pride in claiming 
possession of the island. The campaign 
was also used to raise awareness about 
the special statute and development 
projects on Rapa Nui (La Nación, 
Special Edition, 22 June 2007). In the 
end, however, the island did not make 
it to the top seven (New Seven Won-
ders Web site).
Rapa Nui may thus not be one of 
the seven wonders of the world, but 
it is certainly a wondrous place to be 
watched closely, in this crucial period 
of political change, which will hope-
fully be for the best of its people. 
lorenz gonschor
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Sa¯moa
As expected, Sämoa’s economy 
continued to thrive during the year. 
And again as expected, the main 
political developments of the latter 
half of 2006 concerned the aftermath 
of the 31 March general elections, 
the breakup of the Samoa Develop-
ment United Party (sdup), and the 
monopoly of political power by the 
governing Human Rights Protection 
Party (hrpp). In the fi rst half of 2007, 
the major political development was 
the passing away, at age ninety-fi ve, 
of one of the world’s oldest heads of 
state, Malietoa Tanumafi li II, and the 
election of Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese 
Tupuola Efi  to replace him.
Although election petitions fol-
lowed the general elections, there were 
not as many as in some previous years. 
Besides the usual disputes between the 
political parties, this time some of the 
petitions concerned members of the 
same political party. In one case, the 
Supreme Court found sdup mem-
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ber Paepae Kapeli Su‘a guilty of two 
counts of bribery during the election 
period and deprived him of his seat. 
The petitioner, Tautoloitua Farani 
Posala, was also found guilty of three 
counts of bribery and three of treating 
(favorable treatment). Both were ruled 
ineligible to contest the by-election. In 
another case, hrpp Member of Parlia-
ment Leanapapa Laki brought an 
election petition alleging bribery and 
treating against his successful oppo-
nent Pa‘u Sefo, who countersued. The 
Supreme Court upheld four allegations 
of bribery and one of treating against 
Pa‘u and his election was declared 
void. Ten allegations of bribery and 
one of treating were also proved 
against Leanapapa. The court stated 
that neither could stand as candidates 
in the by-election.
The case that attracted the most 
interest, however, was brought by 
Samoa Party Leader Su‘a Rimoni Ah 
Chong against Minister of Communi-
cations and Technology Mulitalo Vui 
Siafausa, alleging bribery and treating. 
On 3 August 2006, the Supreme Court 
dismissed all charges relating to brib-
ery or treating against the minister on 
the grounds of insuffi cient evidence. 
This left one charge against him, 
involving an o‘o or gift presentation 
(fi ne mats, food, or money, separately 
or together) he had made at Vaimoso, 
an urban village in Apia. The question 
for the court to decide was whether 
such an o‘o was legal.
Su‘a’s petition stated that the o‘o 
at Vaimoso was illegal because it 
occurred in a village that is not in 
the minister’s constituency, while 
Mulitalo’s lawyer, Toleafoa Solomona, 
argued it was an o‘o regardless of 
where it was made. To support his 
case, the respondent acquired the 
services of a cultural specialist, Fuima-
ono Fereti Tupua, who argued that it 
was acceptable for an o‘o to be made 
outside the boundaries of an electoral 
constituency because all electors were 
entitled to their share of the gifts. In 
other words, Fuimaono stated, an o‘o 
should follow electors wherever they 
were (SO, 5 Aug 2006). Mulitalo had 
already presented an o‘o to Lano, 
Asaga, and Pu‘apu‘a, the three villages 
in the constituency.
The legal opinion from lawyer 
Daryle Clarke of the Attorney Gener-
al’s Offi ce did not help the minister’s 
case. Representing Electoral Commis-
sioner Tanuvasa Isitolo, Clarke argued 
that if such an activity occurred 
outside the physical boundary of a 
constituency, it could not be regarded 
as an o‘o. The implication was that 
if it was not an o‘o and legitimized 
by custom, then it was bribery and 
therefore illegal. After nine days of 
hearings, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the o‘o at Vaimoso was illegal 
and found Mulitalo guilty of bribery. 
In a thirty-fi ve-page decision, the court 
said it was not satisfi ed that there had 
been a change in custom to allow an 
o‘o to be made outside a constitu-
ency. Mulitalo’s election was therefore 
declared void.
In a counter-petition, Mulitalo 
fi led criminal charges against Su‘a for 
treating and bribery. Three charges of 
bribery were brought against Su‘a, one 
of which was later withdrawn. Su‘a 
was accused of giving Faalafi  Tau-
ave sat$50 to induce him, his wife, 
and their children to vote for him in 
the general elections (currently, one 
Samoan tala [sat$)] = us$.36). He 
was also charged with giving a brand 
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new television set to the family of 
Muliaga Faalafi  to solicit his support 
and that of his family (SO, 28 Sept 
2006). Su‘a denied both charges, say-
ing his gift of money was motivated 
only by custom and appreciation for 
the generous hospitality shown to him 
by the family. The television set was 
a gift to a relative and his acts were 
the result of kindness and charity 
(SO, 20 Sept 2006). On 26 September 
2006, the court found that the brib-
ery charge relating to the sat$50 gift 
to Faalafi  Tauave was not proven, 
but upheld the charge relating to the 
television set.
Chief Justice Patu wondered 
why Su‘a presented the television to 
Muliaga Faalafi ’s mother, Malama, 
two days before the election, when he 
did not give out his usual Christmas 
gifts to the other poor, elderly, and 
sick residents of Lano. He noted that 
the family had not asked for a televi-
sion set, but had only asked that Su‘a 
take the old one for repairs in Apia. 
Su‘a need only have told Malama that 
the television set could not be fi xed, 
or give her a new set after the elec-
tions. The important factors to be 
considered, the chief justice said, were 
the imminence of the election, and the 
value of the television set and aerial, 
more than sat$300—a big gift to a 
poor family. Patu concluded that “the 
dominant motive behind the giving of 
the tv set to Malama was not charity 
but to induce her to support and vote 
for the defendant at the election” (SO, 
29 Sept 2006). Su‘a was “shattered” 
by the decision, which incurred a 
sat$300 fi ne. It was clear, he said, that 
the law did not distinguish between 
relatives and electors. He vowed to 
return the Transparency International 
Integrity Award that he had won in 
May 2003.
Both Mulitalo and Su‘a come from 
Lano village, and they were the only 
two candidates in the general elec-
tions. Their rivalry split the village 
into two factions. When Su‘a lodged 
his petition against Mulitalo, he was 
banned from the village by the opposi-
tion. Mulitalo denied having anything 
to do with the ban. And when Muli-
talo lost, Su‘a’s family home at Lano 
was burned by a person who was 
later caught and charged by police. 
In retaliation, Su‘a complained to the 
Supreme Court, which ordered the 
Lano village council to revoke the 
ostracism order against Su‘a or risk 
going to jail. In making the order, 
Justice Pierre Slicer said the village 
council’s power was not greater than 
that of the Legislative Assembly, the 
constitution, the electoral act, the 
head of state, or the Supreme Court. 
The banishment was illegal because it 
violated the right of citizens to a free 
election (SO, 8 Aug 2006). However, 
after further consultations between 
Chief Justice Patu and the two Aus-
tralian judges of the court, the order 
was amended to enable the village 
council to fi le a petition with the Land 
and Titles Court to settle the dispute 
within seven days, failing which pros-
ecutions would follow. Eventually, the 
village canceled its banishment order.
Several by-elections took place 
following the election petitions and 
the death of two sitting members of 
Parliament. In the by-election for 
Faasaleleaga No. 2 in September, 
Pa‘u’s daughter and hrpp candidate 
Letoa Rita edged out another hrpp 
candidate, Papalii Samuelu Petaia. At 
age thirty, Letoa Rita was the young-
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est of the candidates and the fi fth 
woman to be elected to the current 
Legislative Assembly. But the politi-
cal struggle in this constituency did 
not end there, because Papalii lodged 
another election petition against Letoa 
Rita, alleging eleven counts of corrupt 
practices. The latter reciprocated by 
fi ling a counter petition, alleging nine 
instances of corrupt practices. After a 
fi ve-day hearing, the Supreme Court 
upheld fi ve allegations of bribery and 
three of treating against Letoa, but 
found that the allegations against 
Papalii had not been proven beyond 
reasonable doubt. The election was 
declared void and Letoa Rita was 
ordered to pay costs of sat$5,000 to 
Papalii. In his third attempt, Papalii 
Samuelu Petaia was fi nally in luck. He 
topped the poll with 384 votes, some 
62 votes more than his nearest rival, 
Papalii Masipa‘u. The incumbents 
for Sagaga le Falefa and Faleata West 
retained their seats after the election 
petitions, and hrpp candidates Vui 
Tupe Ioane and Muagututia Siaosi 
Meredith gained a further two seats in 
by-elections held 6 October 2006.
Two members of Parliament passed 
away: Sililoto Tolo Tuaifai, age sixty-
seven, member for Vaimauga West, 
and Manuleleua L Leleua, age eighty-
two, member for Faleata East. The 
Vaimauga West by-election was won 
by Patu Ativalu Togi II, a former sdup 
member of Parliament, but running 
under the hrpp ticket. The Faleata 
East by-election was won by former 
Member of Parliament Patauave 
Etuale, who was solidly backed by 
Vaimoso village, while the only other 
candidate, Aveau Niko Palamo, had 
strong backing at Lepea and Vailoa 
villages.
As of June 2007, then, the composi-
tion of the political parties had hardly 
changed since the time of the general 
elections on 31 March 2006, when 
the Human Rights Protection Party 
commanded 35 seats, the others being 
split between the Samoa Development 
United Party and Independents. After 
the election petitions and by-elections, 
the Human Rights Protection Party 
controlled 36 seats (an increase of 
one), the Samoa Development United 
Party 7 seats, and Independents 6 
seats.
Soon after the general elections the 
stresses that had affected the Samoa 
Development United Party as a result 
of its poor performance in the elec-
tions were made manifest, dealing a 
blow to party politics in Sämoa. In 
August 2006, fi ve of the nine members 
of the party staged a coup d’état by 
ousting party leader Lemamea Ropati 
and substituting lawyer Asiata Vaai 
with Mulipola Oliva as deputy leader. 
The “rebels” claimed that under the 
constitution, the majority had the right 
to decide the party leader. However, 
changes in the command structure 
are normally carried out in a formal 
caucus meeting, and the only person 
who had the authority to call such a 
meeting was Lemamea. Accordingly, 
Lemamea and others—including vet-
eran Aeau Peniamina, former Speaker 
of the Legislative Assembly; Fuimaono 
Naoia Tei, member for Falealili; and 
Sililoto Tolio Tuaifaiva, member for 
Vaimauga West—refused to accept the 
rebels’ “misguided” action. 
The rebel members claimed the rea-
son for their change of allegiance was 
Lemamea’s poor leadership qualities. 
For instance, Asiata said, the party 
had no plans for the next fi ve to ten 
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years, and if the party was to succeed 
in toppling the Human Rights Protec-
tion Party from power, it had to move 
forward under new leadership (SO, 31 
Aug 2006). Lemamea in turn accused 
Asiata of wanting to be the party’s 
leader since he joined the Samoa 
Development United Party. In a letter 
to the Samoa Observer, he accused 
Asiata of removing Tupua Tamasese 
Efi  as leader and Leilua Manuao as 
deputy leader of the Samoa National 
Development Party (sndp). Asiata was 
also responsible for changing the par-
ty’s name from sndp to sdup. Having 
accomplished these goals, Lemamea 
said, Asiata continued to try and have 
Lemamea removed as leader. Despite 
attempts at reconciliation, the differ-
ences between the two factional lead-
ers were too deep. Finally, Lemamea 
decided to step down as leader of the 
party. In tears he told supporters he 
could never work with Asiata again. 
However, he wished the new party 
leader well for the future (SO, 28 Sept 
2006).
But this was not the end of the 
political drama. Under House regula-
tions, a political party has to have 
a minimum of eight members to be 
recognized by the Speaker. At the end 
of the March general elections, the 
Samoa Development United Party 
had ten members, but lost one as a 
result of an election petition against 
Paepae Kapeli Su‘a. As a result of the 
ensuing struggle for leadership, both 
Lemamea Ropati and Sililoto Tolo 
Tuaifaiva resigned from the party to 
become Independent members. This 
left only seven party members, one 
short of the required minimum. Asiata 
took the matter to the Supreme Court, 
but Chief Justice Patu ruled that the 
Speaker’s actions were in accordance 
with the provisions of Standing Order 
20 that covers such matters (SO, 22 
March 2007).
These developments were not 
forced on the country by the ruling 
Human Rights Protection Party. In 
fact, when the leadership struggle 
within the Samoa Development United 
Party came out into the open, Prime 
Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi 
urged moderation. He said if the issue 
was not resolved, and if there was 
only one political party in Parliament, 
that was “not what democracy is 
about.” He said it was important to 
have a good opposition leader, because 
such a person was a potential future 
prime minister of the country (SO, 16 
Sept 2007). Given the rapid social, 
economic, and political development 
being successfully pushed by the hrpp 
government, it is diffi cult to envision 
the emergence of another dominant 
political party in the near future.
The passing away of His Highness 
Malietoa Tanumafi li II Sämoa’s head 
of state since 1962, on 10 May 2007, 
marked the end of an era. Malietoa 
represented an era of decoloniza-
tion, when the New Zealand colonial 
administration attempted to make 
peace with Samoan political dissidents 
(the Mau) and prepare Sämoa for 
independence. In 1945 New Zea-
land began to send Samoan students 
on scholarship to New Zealand to 
train them to take over public service 
positions from expatriates. In 1949, 
Malietoa was appointed to the highest 
position possible for an indigenous 
person in Sämoa, that of Fautua, 
or chief adviser to the administra-
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tor, together with Tupua Tamasese 
Meaole. In that same year, he was 
made chairman of a committee to 
prepare Sämoa for independence, and 
when this fi nally came in 1962, he and 
Tamasese were appointed co-heads of 
state for life. Unfortunately Tamasese 
died in 1963, leaving Malietoa to 
serve as the sole head of state until 
the time of his death. His tenure was 
marked by an attitude of tolerance 
and moderation in all things. He had a 
great impact on the judicial system by 
refusing to allow capital punishment, 
always commuting death sentences 
to life imprisonment. Several years 
ago, the Samoan Parliament abolished 
capital punishment, thanks indirectly 
to the infl uence of Malietoa.
Within weeks of Malietoa’s death, 
all the political parties unanimously 
supported the election of former 
Prime Minister Tupuola Efi  as the 
new head of state for a term of fi ve 
years, in accordance with the constitu-
tion. Tupuola Efi  was prime minister 
from 1976 to 1979, and from 1979 
to 1981, and, over the years, acquired 
two higher matai titles as well: Tui 
Atua and Tupua. He is also a noted 
scholar of Samoan language, folklore, 
and culture. His academic achieve-
ments have been recognized by Te 
Matahauariki Institute at Waikato 
University, which made him an associ-
ate member; by Te Whare Wänanga 
o Awanuiärangi, the tribal university 
where he is an adjunct professor; and 
by the National University of Samoa, 
where he is a frequent speaker. Tui 
Atua Tupua Tamasese Tupuola Efi  is 
very much a product of the postcolo-
nial era, characterized by the people’s 
desire for education, upward mobility, 
identity, and a place in the world. He 
is eminently suited to help the Samoan 
people achieve their goals and aspira-
tions.
unasa l f va‘a
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Tuvalu Update
In this special segment, Bikenibeu 
Paeniu, Tuvalu Minister for Finance, 
Planning, and Industries, provides his 
own account of some events analyzed 
by Tauaasa Taafaki in a 2004–2006 
review of Tuvalu ( The Contemporary 
Pacifi c 19 (1): 276–286 [2007]).
In the review, Taafaki discussed 
events surrounding a march on Parlia-
ment in April 2006 organized by the 
Chamber of Commerce. Paeniu notes 
that the controversy involved a grant 
provided by Taiwan for Small/Medium 
Enterprises and administered by his 
ministry: “The article gave the impres-
sion that this grant was intended for 
the Chamber of Commerce. However, 
it was for small and medium sized 
enterprises, not for the Chamber of 
Commerce. To protect the grant from 
being politicized, I outlined in a mem-
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orandum to the secretary for Finance 
how the funds would be administered: 
us$100,000 was to be administered 
by the Small Business Centre in the 
Department of Commerce and Indus-
tries and used for training entrepre-
neurs; $30,000 would take the form of 
a direct grant to the Chamber of Com-
merce (this amount was determined 
based on an earlier written submission 
by the chamber); and the balance of 
the money would be administered 
by the Development Bank of Tuvalu 
(dbt). In the same memo I asked 
the secretary for Finance to work 
out clear terms of reference for the 
administration of the dbt grant, and 
I subsequently obtained the approval 
of cabinet for the policy overall. When 
I returned from an overseas trip I 
learned that the secretary and the 
president of the Chamber of Com-
merce had lobbied all the ministers, 
including the prime minister. After 
the Speaker refused a request to allow 
them to meet with Parliament, they 
called on their members to march. 
I met with the marchers when they 
arrived at Parliament and explained 
the government’s side of the story. My 
department secretary, accountant, and 
aid coordinator were also present to 
clarify the situation with regard to the 
grant and the disbursement of funds. 
The marchers started disbursing as the 
members came to understand my side 
of the story.”
Bikenibeu Paeniu also took excep-
tion to an assertion in the review that 
as Minister of Finance he was “fi rmly 
behind” a German-based proposal 
to establish a bank in Tuvalu, which 
turned out to be a scam. Paeniu states 
that in 2004 he was asked by Prime 
Minister Toafa to investigate the Ger-
man proposal. “He handed me the 
documentation and especially a ‘red’ 
[book] that contained all the details of 
the proposal. I expressed my reserva-
tions, but the prime minister insisted 
that I take it on board. It so happened 
that the Head of the Pacifi c Financial 
Technical Assistance Centre (pftac) 
was visiting, so I gave him the ‘red’ 
book and requested his advice. The 
pftac came back and advised no. 
However the Prime Minister insisted I 
take a closer look at it.  In early 2005 
we traveled to Germany, where we 
visited the oecd [Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment] as well as the Centre for Money 
Laundering and Tax Offi ce in Bonn. 
Although we agreed for the German 
investors to come to Tuvalu to make a 
presentation to Cabinet and members 
of the public, their proposal was yet to 
be offi cially endorsed. I still had many 
serious questions about a proposal 
that seemed too good to be true. 
Negotiations continued, the proposal 
got more complex, and the press got 
involved. The late Robert Keith Reid 
was preparing to publish an article, 
and I managed to consult him in time 
and provided my side of the story. 
He fi nally wrote an article for Islands 
Business, which I liked very much 
(Keith-Reid and Pareti 2005). As the 
dialogue continued, I came to realize 
that the German proposal was becom-
ing more complicated, when by this 
time it should have been more easily 
understood, so I came to the conclu-
sion that it was a scam. Eventually I 
said no to the proposal and informed 
the cabinet accordingly. My decision 
was not the result of pressure from 
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Australia, New Zealand, or anybody 
else. The whole proposal was a fake, 
and I came to believe that the inves-
tors were simply after Tuvalu’s Trust 
Fund.”
Reference
Keith-Reid, Robert, and Samisoni Pareti. 
2005. Tuvalu’s Next Big Hope. Islands 
Business, August. Online at http://www
.islandsbusiness.com/archives
Wallis And Futuna
On Sunday, 1 April 2007, the 11,165 
registered voters in Wallis and Futuna 
elected the twenty members of the 
Territorial Assembly. Thirteen of the 
twenty incumbent assembly members 
were part of the national presidential 
majority lead by Ermenegilde Simete 
(Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
[ump], from Mua). The archipelago is 
divided into fi ve electoral constituen-
cies, with thirteen territorial repre-
sentative seats for the three Wallisian 
districts (Mua, Hahake, and Hihifo), 
and seven seats for the two kingdoms 
of Futuna (Sigave and Alo). Twenty-
six party lists were fi led for these elec-
tions just before the proportional vote. 
Three women were listed at the head 
of their parties along with Victor Brial, 
the ump territorial deputy.
An audiovisual campaign, moni-
tored by the French media authority 
(Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel 
[csa]), was broadcast by rfo (Réseau 
France Outre-mer) on both radio and 
television—the only media currently 
available there. This was the second 
time this had occurred in Wallis and 
Futuna. Unfortunately, a breakdown 
in the aging plane that provides 
domestic fl ights for the two-hundred-
thirty kilometer journey between 
Wallis and Futuna caused a problem 
for certain candidates in recording 
campaign messages.
While the health of the elderly 
lavelua (paramount chief, or king) 
remained precarious (see the account 
of the 2005 customary law crisis in 
Angleviel 2006), the question of his 
succession was not an issue in this 
campaign. The rate of voter participa-
tion, always very high, was 75 per-
cent. Twenty of the twenty-six party 
lists obtained a seat. Seventeen incum-
bent representatives ran for reelec-
tion, and fourteen of them succeeded. 
Two women were voted into the new 
assembly with a fi ve-year mandate. 
Ermenegilde Simete was reelected, 
despite being beaten by Donald 
Mercier (a candidate with Socialist 
leanings) in Mua. Simete won 481 
votes, compared to his competitor’s 
392. ump deputy Victor Brial came 
in fi rst in the Sigave electorate with 
309 votes. The departing ump major-
ity representatives were either directly 
reelected (as was the case for ten of 
them), or replaced by new representa-
tives also favoring this majority.
Due to the wide range of vot-
ing possibilities, negotiations were 
held to strengthen the ump majority. 
The ump/consolidated right parties 
came out slightly ahead in the end, 
winning twelve seats to the Social-
ist/consolidated left’s eight seats. On 
11 April, Pesamino Taputai, a member 
of the udf (Union pour la démocra-
tie française)–MoDem (Mouvement 
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démocrate), a centralist party, became 
president of the Territorial Assembly, 
with Victor Brial elected vice presi-
dent, and Ermenegilde Simete presi-
dent of the permanent commission.
On 22 April 2007, 7,208 voters 
(64.5 percent) went to the polls for the 
French presidential elections, with the 
following results: Olivier Besancenot 
71 votes (0.99 percent); Marie-George 
Buffet 40 votes (0.56 percent); Gérard 
Schivardi 15 votes (0.21 percent); 
François Bayrou 804 (11.20 percent); 
José Bove 41 votes (0.57 percent); 
Dominique Voynet 60 votes (0.84 
percent); Philippe de Villiers 14 votes 
(0.20 percent); Ségolène Royal 2,832 
votes (39.46 percent); Frédéric Nihous 
25 votes (0.35 percent); Jean-Marie 
Le Pen 86 votes (1.20 percent); Arlette 
LaGuiller 63 votes (0.88 percent); and 
Nicolas Sarkozy 3,125 votes (43.55 
percent).
Sixty-nine percent of Wallisians and 
Futunians turned out to vote during 
the second round of the presidential 
election on 6 May 2007; 3,866 voted 
for Nicolas Sarkozy (50.17 percent), 
while 3,840 voted for Ségolène Royal. 
There has been a clear shift in Wal-
lis and Futuna toward the left, which 
may be due either to a change in atti-
tude or to voters being weary of the 
principal local authorities, who have 
been in offi ce for a long time.
The victory of the departing ump 
deputy following the presidential elec-
tions seemed to be a foregone conclu-
sion in June 2007. However, surpris-
ingly, Victor Brial was beaten by 
Socialist Albert Likuvalu. This result 
was due to declining support for those 
in power too long (which is often a 
problem in small insular areas), as 
well as a combination of several other 
factors: Likuvalu’s strong support for 
the former lavelua during the 2005 
customary law crisis, internal confl icts 
in the local ump chapter, and private 
problems in Futuna.
The 2007 legislative elections were 
held on 10 and 17 June 2007. In the 
fi rst round, Victor Brial received 2,624 
votes (33.7 percent); Albert Likuvalu 
2,424 votes (31.1 percent); Atonia 
Ilalio 973 votes (12.5 percent); Pesa-
mino Taputai 661 votes (8.5 percent); 
and Ermenegilde Simete 1,101 votes 
(14.1 percent). The smaller parties 
then joined forces with the larger ones, 
as they usually do. Simete (ump) and 
Taputai (udf) from the territorial 
majority gave their support to Vic-
tor Brial and, once Atonio Ilalio, the 
third candidate, had been eliminated, 
he asked his supporters to vote for 
Likuvalu. In the meantime, Donald 
Mercier, though Socialist, stated prior 
to the fi rst round that he would vote 
for Brial, asking his territorial voters 
to do the same.
In the second round on 17 June 
2007, Likuvalu received 4,152 votes 
(51.79 percent), while Brial only 
received 3,865. It should be noted 
that in the fi rst round the number of 
people voting by power of attorney 
was 20 percent, while the number of 
abstaining voters was 29.67 percent. 
In the second round, 27.50 percent 
abstained. Likuvalu, the new deputy, 
was born on 14 November 1943 in 
Alo. He was the fi rst Wallisian to 
obtain a baccalaureate, and after 
earning a master’s degree in geogra-
phy from the University of Lyon, he 
became the fi rst certifi ed teacher in his-
tory-geography. His opposition party, 
Alliance d’opposition (opposing the 
ump), was recently absorbed by the 
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local chapter of the national Socialist 
party (ps) to which he belongs. Victor 
Brial has appealed the results of the 
election.
In customary law matters, the 
Administrative Court of Mata‘utu 
studied approximately fi fty appeals 
presented by the leaders of Uvea on 
12 March 2007. These were intended 
to render null and void the prefecto-
rial decrees made by Xavier de Fürst, 
who represented the French State 
during the 2005 crisis. At that time 
the prefect had, among other things, 
published several decrees recognizing 
the customary law chiefs who were in 
favor of change. The court fi nally ren-
dered null and void the decrees made 
by Fürst and ordered the State to pay 
damages to the territorial constitu-
ency of Uvea, or in other words, to the 
members of the lavelua’s governing 
body. The court cited Article 3 of the 
1961 statute that in part specifi cally 
“prohibits any involvement of the 
Republic’s institutions in the opera-
tion of customary law institutions, 
and does not give any administrative 
authority either to the State or the ter-
ritory in questions of customary law.”
Lavelua Tomasi Kulimoetoke, king 
of Wallis since 1959 and father of 
six, died on 7 May 2007 at the age 
of eighty-eight. A six-month period 
of mourning was decreed and a new 
lavelua cannot be named until it is 
over. Some people have raised the pos-
sibility of amending customary law to 
replace the lavelua by the three district 
chiefs (faipule), thereby reinforcing 
their authority.
In military affairs, the French frig-
ate Jacques Cartier arrived in  Wallis 
on 5 May with a detachment of 
twenty naval infantrymen (Régiment 
d’Infanterie de Marine du Pacifi que 
[Nouvelle Calédonie] or rimap-nc) 
aboard. They were quartered in the 
village of Halalo, where they built a 
fale (traditional house) as part of their 
tour of duty.
The Wallisian and Futunian com-
munity in New Caledonia, number-
ing over 20,000 people, remains the 
archipelago’s key link with the outside 
world. A special agreement among the 
State, New Caledonia, and the island 
territory of Wallis and Futuna, speci-
fi ed in Article 225 of the organic law 
dated 19 March 1999 affecting New 
Caledonia, was signed into law on 1 
December 2003. This agreement for-
malized relations between Wallis and 
Futuna and New Caledonia. Articles 
1 and 2 of the agreement concern 
the organization of services provided 
by the State, with the latter provid-
ing that services in New Caledonia 
and the island territory of Wallis and 
Futuna can be organized separately. 
A private civil aviation department 
specifi cally for Wallis and Futuna was 
therefore created by interministerial 
decree on 12 July 2006, fully inde-
pendent of the one existing in New 
Caledonia. A defense ministry decree 
dated 22 November 2005 replaced a 
national police detachment stationed 
on the islands of Wallis and Futuna 
with a company, and increased the 
number of staff. The creation of the 
Department of Health and Social Ser-
vices within the Work Inspection and 
Social Services Administration was 
formalized by a Territorial Assembly 
decree of 2 August 2006. This decree 
was necessary to better coordinate the 
territory’s health and social policy.
Article 4 of the agreement allows 
for New Caledonia and the island 
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territory of Wallis and Futuna “to 
discuss (when necessary) subjects hav-
ing an impact on the . . . expatriate 
community.” Periodic meetings take 
place between Wallis and Futuna’s 
Territorial Assembly president and the 
president of the government of New 
Caledonia, to discuss specifi c subjects.
On 1 September 2006, the City 
of Noumea’s Jeudi du Centre-Ville 
(Thursday evening open air market) 
was dedicated to Wallis and Futuna 
and its expatriate community. On 
13 September 2006, the Territorial 
Advisory board for the women of 
 Wallis and Futuna put on an exhibit of 
Wallisian and Futunian arts and crafts 
in Noumea. Following sixteen months 
of construction, the Wallisian and 
Futunian community of Vallon-Dore 
inaugurated a new church dedicated 
to St Theresa on 24 September 2006. 
Aloisio Vaitulukina, president of the 
kingdom of Sagave’s expatriate com-
munity since 1994, died on 12 June 
2007 at the age of seventy-one.
frédéric angleviel
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